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Reexamining the Market for Judicial Clerks and
Other Assortative Matching Markets
George L. Priese
For many decades, scholars have puzzled over why the market for
judicial clerks has been characterized by increasingly early bidding, with
interviews and offers extended at progressively early points in a student's law
school career. An important article published recently by Avery, Jolls, Judge
Posner, and Roth reported the results of a study the authors conducted of
judges and clerks documenting the many ways in which the market operated
inefficiently. In their view, the clerk market corresponds to other markets
studied, chiefly by Roth, that show timing disturbances claimed to be market
failures. The authors recommended adoption of a modified matching
program, similar to the program that matches medical residents with
hospitals.
This paper reanalyzes the clerkship market and the other markets studied
by Professor Roth from the standpoint of the costs and benefits of information
acquisition. It shows that, far from market failure, the use of time as a
currency in the market represents the working out of market forces where
other, more traditional terms of trade-in particular, price-are unavailable.
This paper also shows that virtually all of the other markets studied by Roth
that show timing peculiarities are characterized by restraints on the use of
price to clear the market.
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Introduction: The Nature of the Problem
The principal interest of academics in the market for judicial clerks has
been in how to regulate it. Building on the concerns of some judges, the
exclusive focus has been on how to control the problematic timing of the
market transactions in which the judge selects the clerk. The perceived harm is
that competition for clerks among judges-especially appellate judges-has
begun earlier and earlier in students' law school careers, when there is limited
evidence of the student's law school perrormance upon which to base the
selection. Over the past decade, there have been various efforts to control the
process by groups of law school deans-for example, by setting uniform
application or fuculty recommendation dates. 1 And there have been attempts by
the Judicial Conference and other assemblies of appellate judges to restrain the
times at which judges begin the application and interview process.
1 As will be described, two recent deans of Yale Law School have been particularly active
in pressing for reforms of this nature.
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Most recently, this past March 2002, an ad-hoc committee of federal
appellate judges organized a referendum among their colleagues that endorsed a
one-year moratorium on hiring c1erks. 2 By this means, judges complying with
the moratorium deferred for a year consideration of candidates who, in the
previously unregulated process, would be applying at the beginning of their
second year of law school, to only accept applications a year later from
candidates who will be beginning their third year. This hiring moratorium was
not strictly binding on the appellate judiciary,3 though it has been equally
endorsed by a large group of law school deans who have pledged to employ
their influence on their faculties and students to abjure from earlier participation
in the application process.4 The moratorium appears to have been generally
successful, postponing the operation of the clerkship market-for the year 2003,
at least-until the beginning of the applicants' third year of law school, though
there are apparently some circuits and some individual judges who have
complained about the compressed time frame for decision that results. Even
more recently, in December 2003, the Ad Hoc Committee endorsed adoption of
the plan again for the 2004 hiring year, though with the addition of a two-week
"reading period" between the date for receiving applications and beginning
interviews to ameliorate that compression.s
This hiring moratorium of the appellate bench follows more than a decade
of debate among the judiciary over the clerk selection process6 and, more
recently, publication of the results of an important survey of appellate judges
and students of their experiences in the 1999 and 2000 clerk markets. The
study-the most extensive empirical analysis extant of the market for judicial
clerks-was conducted by a distinguished group of social scientists from
Harvard and the University of Chicago, one of whom is an equally
distinguished federal judge, Richard A. Posner, whose endorsement and
participation surely enhanced the extent and frankness of judicial response to
2 See Memorandum from Chief Judge Edward R. Becker and Judge Harry T. Edwards, to
Law School Deans (Mar. 11,2002) (on file with author).
3 Indeed, the moratorium has been opposed by some judges. See James M. Rosenbaum,
Federal Judges Try To Imitate OPEC, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19,2002, at A12.
4 Letter from Jeffrey Lehman, Dean of the University of Michigan Law School, on behalf
of himself and fifieen other law school deans, to the Members of the Ad Hoc Committee of Federal
Appellate Judges (Apr. 3, 2002) (on file with author); see also Letter from Jeffrey S. Lehman,
President, American Law Deans Association, to Members of the Ad Hoc Committee of Federal
Appellate Judges (Mar. 28,2002) (on file with author).
5 REPORT OF THE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON LAW CLERK HIRING ENDORSING A LAw CLERK
HIRING PLAN FOR 2004, at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/bin/lawclerkllawclerkpdflcommittee~report_
endorsing_2004ylan.pdf(last visited Nov. 12,2004) [hereinafter 2004 PLAN].
6 E.g., Patricia M. Wald, Selecting Law Clerks, 89 MrcH. L. REv. 152 (1990); Alex Kozinski,
Confessions ofa Bad Apple, 100 VALE L.J. 1707 (1991); Louis F. Oberdorfer & Michael N. Levy, On
Clerkship Selection: A Reply to the Bad Apple, 101 YALE LJ. 1097 (1992).
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the survey.7 The Harvard-Chicago Study concluded that the unregulated clerk
market was plagued by inefficiencies: decisions were made at inefficiently early
times; both judges and students expended inefficient search costs; and decisions
were made based on inadequate information. More damning, the process was
unfuir in many respects and had degenerated into an ethics and practice creating
a "frenzy of hiring [that] has cast thc judiciary into disrepute ....,,8 The
authors proposed the adoption of a mandatory matching program similar to the
mandatory program that, by means of a centralized computer algorithm,
matches medical school graduates with hospital residencies.9 The authors
recognized that many federal judges-independent and protected under the
Constitution by lifetime tenure-would resist being bound by a computer
matching program, and so proposed as an amendment that the match be
mandatory only for those judges who wanted their clerks considered for
Supreme Court clerkships.lo
The Harvard-Chicago Study, in tum, follows from the work of one of its
co-authors, Alvin E. Roth, who has studied problems associated with timing
decisions in markets for now almost two decades. 1I Professor Roth has
investigated markets characterized by what he has termed "unraveling,,:12 a
form of market fuilure in which transactions occur at earlier, and often
increasingly earlier, time periods than what would seem appropriate to
maximize the information available to market participants. Professor Roth's
wide-ranging work has identified a myriad of markets in which unraveling of
this nature occurs: the choice of internships within various medical sub-
specialties, the allocation of athletes in professional sports leagues, medieval
and modem commodity markets, and the market for judicial clerks, among
others. n Professor Roth has categorized these various markets into four separate
7 Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner & Alvin E. Roth, The Market for
Federal Judicial Law Clerks, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 793 (2001) [hereinafter Harvard-Chicago Study].
Avery, Jolls and Roth are from Harvard; Judge Posner of the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals is from the
University of Chicago.
8 Id. at 796. The authors' discuss judicial disrepute or what they call the "disillusionment
norm." Id. at 798-99, 834-40. The Harvard-Chicago Study is reviewed at length infra Part I.
9 The medical matching program is discussed at length infra Sections I.B-C.
10 Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at 875-76. The Study'S proposals are discussed
infra Section LB.
II E.g., Alvin E. Roth, The Evolution ofthe Labor Marketfor Medical Interns and Residents:
A Case Study in Game Theory, 92 J. PoL. ECON. 991 (1984) [hereinafter Roth, Medical Interns]; Alvin
E. Roth, On the Allocation ofResidents to Rural Hospitals: A General Property ofTwo-Sided Matching
Markets, 54 ECONOMETRICA 425 (1986). Professor Roth's most general and extensive study of
assortative matching markets is Alvin E. Roth & Xiaolin Xing, Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and
Institutions Related to. the Timing ofMarket Transactions, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 992 (1994) [hereinafter
Roth & Xing].
12 To my knowledge, he coined this term-now common in the literature-to describe the
early transaction phenomenon.
13 Roth & Xing, supra note II. The Harvard-Chicago Study reviews Roth's work on these
markets. Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at 845-58. It is reviewed here infra Section I.C.
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stages according to the level of regulation of timing decisions adopted to
rationalize each market, ranging from stage I, an unregulated market with
substantial unraveling, to stage 4, a market controlled by a centralized
matching mechanism, yet with unraveling around the edges. 14 Professor Roth
himself has been instrumental in designing market matching programs, chiefly
in medical fields, both in the United States and abroad in order to control the
unraveling problem. The Harvard-Chicago Study of the market for judicial
clerks adopts the Roth four-stage model in its entirety in recommending the
adoption of a modified medical matching program for the selection of judicial
15
clerks.
Professor Roth's work today dominates the economic understanding of
markets characterized by unraveling,16 just as the Harvard-Chicago Study,
which builds on his work, dominates current analysis of the market for judicial
clerks. This paper, however, takes a different approach. It first evaluates the
market for judicial clerks-and, later, some of the other markets studied by
Professor Roth-to determine what it is about those markets that generates the
transaction timing phenomena that are perceived to be so troublesome. First,
there exist many markets in which the timing of purchase and sale transactions
differs greatly, yet where these differences are not regarded as problems. One
distinctive feature of the clerk market, as well as of the many medical residency
markets studied by Professor Roth, is that transactions occur in the presence of
substantial uncertainty: uncertainty about the productivity of the prospective
clerk or of the success ofthe applicant in obtaining a prestigious clerkship. Yet,
there are many other markets in which transactions occur under conditions of
less than complete information not characterized by unraveling. And there are
many labor markets in which the same sorts of uncertainties must exist-say,
the markets for high school or college graduates-which appear innocent of
timing disorders.
The different approach of the paper derives from the examination of these
various markets from the standpoint of the costs of continued search and the
marginal value to the prospective transaction of the collection of additional
information. As we shall see, the market for judicial clerks is unusual in that
there exists-at least in comparison to other markets-an extremely limited
range for the forms of negotiation over terms that enables other markets,
14 These stages are summarized in Roth & Xing, supra note II, at 993, and described infra
text accompanying notes 138-167.
15 Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at 846-47,871-84.
16 For slightly different views, see Hao Li & Sherwin Rosen, Unraveling in Matching
Markets, 88 AM. ECON. REv. 371 (1988) (accepting the unraveling framework but explaining it as a
form of insurance purchase in contexts of incomplete futures markets); and Ulrich Kamecke, Wage
Formation in a Centralized Matching Market, 39 INT'L ECON. REV. 33 (1998) (attributing the need for
matching in the market for medical interns to insufficiently differentiated wages). These articles are
discussed infra Part II.
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including labor markets, to clear. In market contexts limited in these ways,
time of commitment becomes an important available currency to clear the
market. As we shall also see, many of the other markets identified by Professor
Roth as suffering unraveling problems are also characterized by limitations on
the terms of trade by participants in the market process. Viewed in this light,
what Professor Roth has called unraveling is not a market failure, but instead
reflects the operation of market processes in contexts in which other market
mechanisms are suppressed. 17 This approach leads to substantially different
normative conclusions concerning the societal benefits of the reforms designed
to eliminate unraveling.
Part I of the paper discusses the current literature on the market for judicial
clerks and attempts to carefully review the helpful Harvard-Chicago Study
describing and evaluating the current clerk market. Part I also discusses the
broader work of Professor Roth regarding a wealth of other markets with
perceived timing problems. Part n presents the economic analysis. Viewed as
an issue of the acquisition of information until the marginal benefits of
additional information are exhausted, the welfare analysis of the unraveling
phenomenon reaches somewhat different conclusions. Part n then returns to the
findings of the Harvard-Chicago Study and other of Professor Roth's work to
reevaluate the characteristics of those markets in light of information costs and
benefits. In the context of the review of the market for judicial clerks, Part II
also discusses the unusual case of Yale Law School whose, recent deans have
been aggressive champions for centralized control on the grounds of mitigating
information deficiency Yale Law graduates purportedly suffer because of the
School's policy of an ungraded first semester. Finally, Part III addresses the
issue of whether, and in what way, the process that is currently characteristic of
the market for judicial clerks casts the federal judiciary into disrepute. IS
I. The Current Understanding of Markets with Timing Problems
This Part reviews historical concerns about the operation of the market for
judicial clerks in the context of other markets that suffur similar unraveling
problems. Section A discusses the history of the market for judicial clerks prior
to the publication of the Harvard-Chicago Study. Section B reviews the
Harvard-Chicago Study itself Section C then looks more broadly at other
markets that are attended by peculiarities in the timing of market transactions.
Virtually all of these markets have been identified and discussed in the work of
Professor Roth.
17 As also will be seen, in other markets identified by Professor Roth, time of commibnent
serves a related means of avoiding forms of price regulation.
18 As will be seen, various commentators on the market for clerks have made points similar
to several of those of this paper. The more careful focus here, however, on information costs and on
market processes aspires to pursue the analysis somewhat more rigorously.
128
HeinOnline -- 22 Yal J. on Reg. 129 2005
Reexamining the Market for Judicial Clerks
A. The History ofDisorders in the Market for Federal Judicial Clerks
There have been concerns about the timing of transactions in the market
for federal appellate judicial clerks at least since the late 1970s,19though seldom
a consensus on how to reform the market. In 1978, the American Association
of Law. Schools issued a set of hiring guidelines; apparently, most of the
judiciary ignored them.20 Some years later, in 1983, the Judicial Conference
requested that judges defer considering applications until the beginning of the
student's third year of law school; again, because of non-compliance, it
abandoned the effort. In 1986, Judge Stephen G. Breyer, then of the First
Circuit Court of Appeals, encouraged judges to adopt April I of the student's
second year as a beginning date; this proposal, too, failed. In 1989, Judge
Breyer and Judge Edward R. Becker of the Third Circuit proposed a March 1
beginning date, circulating a letter to the entire federal appellate judiciary
seeking agreement among the judges to become binding if 85% signed on.
Only 75% agreed, and the eflDrt again was dropped.
The operation of the market for clerks, however, was transformed from a
subject of casual complaints and individual reform crusades into one of more
widespread judicial concern in 1989 by the publication of an article in the New
York Times by David Margolick.21 Margolick revealed to the national public
the increasingly hectic character of the clerk market. His characterization was
flamboyant and has been often quoted since: describing the clerk market as a
"free-for-all," a "frenzied mating ritual," quotin§ a Stanford student, describing
appellate judges as "behaving like 6-year olds.' 2
Margolick's article spurred intensified reform efforts. A group of judges,
led again by Judges Breyer and Becker, now joined by Judge James Oakes of
the Second Circuit and Judge Patricia M. Wald of the D.C. Circuit, obtained
an agreement from judges in ten of the thirteen federal circuits not to issue offers
during the 1990 clerkship market until May I at 12:00 p.m. EST and to allow
all offurs to remain open fur twenty-four hours. According to Judge Wald,
describing the market that year, though there were some defections by judges
making early offers, most judges initially complied. 23 Yet as judges perceived
that their colleagues in the three circuits which had not agreed to the deadline
were gaining an advantage, defections increased. Judge Wald explains, "[i]n
19 The literature describing the clerk market focuses on federal clerks, chiefly federal
appellate clerks. Thus, it is not known whether markets for state appellate court clerks or clerks in
specialized courts, such as the Tax Court, suffer similar timing problems.
20 This history of reform efforts through 1994 is taken from Edward R. Becker et aI., The
Federal Judicial Law Clerk Hiring Problem and the Modest March 1 Solution, 104 YALE L.J. 207
(1994).
21 David Margolick, At the Bar: Annual Race for Clerks Becomes a Mad Dash, N. Y. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 1989, at B4.
22 Id.
23 Wald, supra note 6, at 158.
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some cases, complying judges rationalized that, in meeting the offer of a
noncomplying judge, they were not violating the agreement.,,24 Then, "[i]n
early April, one of the major circuits withdrew ....,,25 As the May I deadline
approached, matters became worse. Some judges enlisted their clerks to make
early calls to applicants. On the morning of May 1, "[a] few judges
weakened. . . and made calls ahead of the deadline. This, in turn, provoked
the students to call other judges they preferred before the noon deadline, ..."
leading to a "destabilizing fluny of pre-deadline transactions.,,26 The May 1
experiment was dropped the next year.27
Margolick's scathing article and the failure of the 1990 reform generated
serious judicial analysis of the market.28 Judge Wald, one of the leaders of the
1990 reform, published an important article in the Michigan Law Review
addressing complaints "that the clerkship selection process is undignified, even
demeaning.,,29 Wald began with a puzzle: why is it so difficult "to conduct a
dignified, collegial, efficient law clerk selection process?,,30 Since the judge
"has no need or ability to dicker on salary or hours or perks, one would expect
the process to go quickly and smoothly.,,3) Instead, the process is characterized
by "covert maneuvering by judges and applicants" and "[j]udges ...
sometimes are unseemly in their pursuit.,,32 Conversely, but equally, "[c]lerk
candidates ... are not themselves without guile; they learn quickly to hedge,
to answer some calls earlier than others, to avoid some calls altogether, and to
solicit time in which to seek competing offers.',33
Judge Wald's explanation was that the significance of clerk quality to the
judge led to vigorous competition for superior clerks. The judge-elerk
relationship was "intense and mutually dependent.',34 The judge is constrained
by a small staff that cannot be supplemented, and judges rarely fire clerks. "If
for any reason one of her clerks proves significantly deficient, she, or the other
clerks, must take up the slack .... [A]n excellent versus a mediocre team of
clerks makes a huge diffurence in the judge's daily life and in her work
24 ld.
25 Jd.
26 Jd. at 159.
27 The 1990 refonn effort is also described in Becker et a1., supra note 20, at 210-11.
28 There had been earlier judicial writings on the character of the clerk market. In a 1986
article. Judge Mikva of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals described the "timing for clerk selection" as
"awful," characterized some of his colleagues as "Sooners," and cracked that some were
"frequenting maternity wards to make sure they get the 'best' clerks." Abner J. Mikva, Judicial
Clerkships: A Judge's View, 36J. LEGAL EDUC. 150,152 (1986).
29 Wald, supra note 6, at 156.
30 ld. at 152.
31 ld.
32 [d. at 152, 156.
33 [d. at 156.
34 [d. at 153.
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product.,,35 Moreover, "[a] judge's reputation among his own colleagues max
in part reflect his ability to garner the most highly-credentialed clerks ...." 6
As a consequence, both judges and clerks had succumbed to a set of strategic
tactics to maximize their opportunities in the market. 37 Judge Wald
recommended the adoption of a matching program much like the medical
match for hospital residencies. 38 Though a matching program would not solve
all problems, it"deserves at least a fair trial. ,,39
Judge Wald's article genemted an immediate response from Judge Alex
Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit. Kozinski admitted that the current opemtion of
the market was unfortunate in some respects, but generally defended the high
level of judicial rivalry over clerks as a "normal, healthy competitive market
process where the parties bargain with each other on roughly equal footing.,,40
Judge Kozinski saw the various proposed reforms as limiting "the means by
which less-favored clerkships can compete for desimble applicants.,,41 According
to Kozinski,
not all clerkships are created equal ... [p]restige counts. Some circuits, the
D.C. Circuit in particular, tcnd to draw a disproportionate share of the
nation's top applicants. Seniority matters. Judges with many years on the
bench naturally have an advantage over upstarts like me who have to work
hard at achieving a national reputation.42
Early offers of positions serve as "a very important bargaining tool for
judges competing for the most gifted clerkship candidates.,,43 Like Judge Wald,
Judge Kozinski noted that a judge could not negotiate on salary or hours or
perquisites.44 But a judge can dicker on "the possibility of ending the
[student's ] agony by accepting an early offer.',45 According to Judge Kozinski,
there were natuml limits to the starting time of the market: "the breakpoint for
many judges ... comes around February or March of a student's second year
of law school" because by then third-semester grades are available, papers will
have been written under faculty supervision, and law review board elections
held.46 Judge Kozinski admitted that there were some problems with the
market: he accepted that tactics such as exploding offers or providing adverse
35 1d.
36 ld. at 154.
37 ld. at 154-55.
38 /d. at 160-63.
39 /d. at 163.
40 Kozinski, supra note 6, at 1714.
41 ld. at 1719.
42 /d.
43 /d.
44 ld. at 1720.
45 ld.
46 Id.at1710.
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infonnation about another judge were "undignified" and "improper.',47 But he
recommended that the only refonn needed was to make the process more open
by fmding "better ways to detect and punish perfidy, strong-ann tactics and
other unethical behavior,',48 urging law schools to compile records of oifunsive
acts by judges.
Judge Kozinski's article was controversial, and it led to a response by the
distinguished D.C. District Court Judge Louis F. Oberdotfer and Michael N.
Levy, one of Judge Oberdorrer's former c1erks;49 Judge Oberdotfer believed that
the unruly clerk markct that Kozinski was defending had e1fucts that were
deeply damaging to society:
Federal judges are sworn to dispense "equal justice to the poor and to the
rich." They are supposed to go about this awesome task deliberately, and
with a dignity that will inspire and maintain firm public confidence in the
decisions that they make and the way that they make them. The present
method used by federal judges to select their law clerks unnecessarily
. d' h nfid ~ .Jeopar Izes t at co I ence.
The principal problem with the market according to Judge Oberdotfer was
the lack of information available to the parties that resulted from. the
competition over early offers. He compared the market for clerks to other entry-
level legal markets:
The federal government subjects attorney applicants to searching inquiries
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Law schools screen faculty
prospects with exquisite care and intense faculty debate. Law firms hire
associates based on their records of accomplishment after two full years of
law school. They prefer to make job offers after personally observing
students' work for an entire summer. Partnership decisions are made only
51 .
after seven or more years of working together.
In contrast, at the time the clerkship offur is extended, judges and clerks
"know practically nothing about each other.,,52 Rejecting Judge Kozinski's free
market analogy, Judge Oberdotfer strongly recommended adoption of the
medical matching program, comparing it to the operation of the New York
Stock Exchange. 53 "A truly rational and efficient free market requires full and
free exchange of infonnation and uninhibited choice of competing products or
services.,,54
Judge Oberdotfer's call for adoption of a matching program proved
unsuccessful. According to one report, the market in 1991 "was as frenetic as
47 Id.at1717.
48 /d. al 1729.
49 Oberdorfer & Levy, supra oole 6.
50 Id. at 1097.
51 /d. at 1099.
52 /d.
53 Id. at 1103-04.
54 Id. at 1103.
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551989 had been. The next year was even worse." In 1993, another refonn was
attempted. Judges Breyer and Becker resumed their efforts with the judiciary.56
Guido Calabresi, then Dean of Yale Law School, wrote to every law school
dean in the nation seeking endorsement of a March I interview date. 57 A large
number endorsed the proposal leading the Judicial Conference to establish
March 1 as the benchmark date for the beginning of clerkship interviews, to
begin March 1, 1994.58 Shortly after the first year of the refurm, Judges Becker,
Breyer and now-Judge Calabresi, since appointed to the Second Circuit,
published an influential article supporting the "March I Solution." Although
they conceded that some judges had failed to comply (the date was only a
benchmark, and not binding), they claimed that most judges had recognized
the benefits of delaying interviews, and the March 1 date deserved compliance
in the future. 59 There were "several problems with the existing 'free market' in
clerkships-all of which were substantially alleviated by the March 1 refonn.,,60
Interviews at earlier dates inteIfere with classes, deny students "the opportunity
to adjust to the rigors of law school," and prevent students "from focusing their
interests in law before deciding whether to apply for a clerkship.,,61 The judges
considered other refonns. The medical match model, endorsed by Judges Wald
and Oberdorfer, was attractive, but its principal problem was that judges found
it "unacceptable.,,62 In a 1989 survey, only one-third approved it. 63 Still,
Kozinski's free-market solution was equally unacceptable.64
There is little systematic evidence of markets for clerks in the years
following 1994, but it appears that the Judicial Conference's benchmark proved
unsustainable. The Conference abandoned the benchmark in 1998,
acknowledging that "it has become apparent that it is not universally followed
and, therefore, is not an accurate reflection of the practice in the courts.
Moreover, there is no consensus within the judiciary as to whether any
alternate standardized policy could be more successful in improving the law
clerk hiring process.',6 A year later, in September 1999, most prominent law
schools withdrew efforts to constrain the time at which faculty recommendation
letters could be sent. 66 The clerkship market continued without regulation.
55 Becker et aI., supra note 20, at 211.
56 /d.at212-13.
57 Id.aI213.
58 /d. aI213-14.
59 /d. aI213, 215, 218-19, 224-25.
60 Id. a1216.
61 Id.at217.
62 Id. at 221-22.
63 Id. at 222.
64 Id.
65 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF TIlE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF TIlE PROCEEDINGS OF TIlE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF TIlE UNITED STATES 38 (1998).
66 Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at 794.
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Concerns about the operation of the clerkship market, however, did not
diminish. As previously mentioned, in 2001 a group of social scientists from
Harvard and the University of Chicago published an economic analysis of the
clerkship market, bolstered by the results of an extensive survey they conducted
of appellate judges, Supreme Court judges, and students at leading law schools
concerning its operation. The analysis built upon the work of Professor Roth,
one of the Harvard-Chicago Study's co-authors, who has pioneered research
into markets characterized by unraveling.
1. The Normative Framework
The authors first set forth a normative framework fOf analysis. They
sought to determine whether the market for clerks 1) cast disrepute on the
judiciary; 2) was efficient, which they defined as providing for "the ability of
market participants to consider and compare the alternatives available in the
marketplace;" and 3) was perceived to operate fairly.67 They found that the
clerkship market failed in every respect. That it contributed to disrepute of the
judiciary was obvious. There were many sources of inefficiency. And there were
many features of the market that appeared substantively unfair.
1) Disrepute of the judiciary. Citing the Margolick article and the various
judicial writings criticizing the clerkship market, the Study accepted entirely
that the current operation of the market harmed the image of the judiciary. "A
system in which hiring occurred in an orderly and respectable manner would be
preferable to a system ..." in which "judges are jockeying for position and
trying to outmaneuver one another in the competition for the best law clerks.,,68
2) Efficiency. There were many ways in which the clerkship market
violated the authors' efficiency norm: offers were made at inefficiently early
times in terms of the acquisition of information.
In a market with limited numbers of buyers and sellers, parties are not
able to gather information about multiple options and then act on that
information to seek out their most preferred alternatives. Choices must be made
from a very small set of alternatives and in a very compressed period. Decisions
must be reached on the basis of extremely limited information. And if
participants try to refine their information, they may not be able to do so in a
timely enough fashion, since time spent in ultimately fruitless courtship (for
67 [d. at 798-805.
68 [d. at 799. The authors accepted the colorful characterization by one circuit court judge,
Alfred E. Goodwin of the Ninth Circuit, Becker et aI., supra note 20, at 210 n.8, that the clerk market
resembled a calf scramble, an occasional Western rodeo event in which youngsters chase calves let
loose in an arena. Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at 799. As we shall see, the analogy is not
exactly apposite. See infra note 20 I.
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instance, in making an offer that is subsequently refused) means that other
candidates will have matched and left the market. All of these features have the
potential to introduce substantial inefficiency.69
Illustrative of the point, the market compelled judges to make decisions
chiefly on the basis of first-year grades, but-based on a review of grades at
Harvard Law School-there were differences between students' fIrst-year and
second-year records, suggesting the likelihood of subsequent judicial error.70
The market was additionally inefficient because both students and judges
expended excessive amounts in search costs because of the need for multiple
interviews. The authors conceded that early offers provided an insurance-like
benefit to risk-averse candidates. 71 But these benefits were more than offset by
efficiency losses from mismatches that occurred because of inadequate
information about potential choices at the time of the market transaction. "The
problem with such early hiring is that [at the time of hire] two-thirds of the
information about the student's academic record in law school, plus virtually
all of the information about the student's legal writing, which typically is done
in the second and third years, is missing."n
The lack of information created substantial risks of mismatches between
judges and students.73
3) Fairness. The authors argued that, important to the evaluation of the
clerkship market, was the perception of fairness in the process itself. The
substantial dissatisfaction with the market of both judges and students
suggested problems in this regard, principally again deriving from the difficulty
of obtaining information about candidates. The authors suggested that
favoritism by judges-in their words, "personal well-connectedness"-may
influence choices which could be perceived as being unfair. 74
2. Empirical Findings
The authors sought to test these normative hypotheses by surveying all
fuderal appellate judges, Justices of the Supreme Court, and samples of law
69 Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at 80 I.
70 ld. at 802-03.
71 ld. at 803-04 (citing Li & Rosen, supra note II. This article is discussed infra note 179.
72 Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at 801-02.
73 ld. In an interesting passage, the authors discussed how to evaluate whether the
mismatches that occur in the clerkship market affect judicial output. They surmised that, if judicial
output is merely an additive function of a judge's and a clerk's abilities, mismatches will have no
effect (Le., the sum total of output will be the same regardless of matching); if the clerk's abilities
provide more benefit to less able judges, mismatches increase output; but, if output is a multiplicative
function of a clerk's and a judge's abilities, mismatches reduce output. ld. at 804. The authors (with
admirable honesty) confessed that they could not confidently define the determinants of judicial
output, and so discarded the issue: "For this reason, we give primary emphasis below to the criterion
of maximizing the satisfaction ofjudges and clerks with the match." ld
74 ld. at 805.
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school students in 1999 and 2000. 75 The results of the surveys confinned the
authors' hypotheses. The survey findings add substantial depth to the
understanding of the opemtion of the clerkship market. According to the
authors, the unregulated clerkship market comprises four steps: (1) interviews
lead quickly to offers; 2) offers require quick responses; 32 responses are
acceptances; and 4) subsequent interviews are canceled.7 This process
established to the authors that the clerkship market was seriously inefficient. 77
1) Interviews lead quickly to offers. The Study found that, in 34% of
interviews, appellate judges extended offers immediately at the end of the
interview. 78 In a cumulative 57% of interviews, offers were extended within two
daYS.79 Of these offers, 36% came from the first judge the student interviewed; a
cumulative 59% came from the first or second judge interviewed.8o .
2) Offers require quick responses. The Study found that "this is not a
market in which students collect a substantial number of offers and then make
their decisions.u81 For 42% of offers, students accepted them immediately upon
receipt; in a cumulative 71 %, students accepted offers within two daYS.82 Here
the Study documented the short-fuse or exploding offer problem that had been
described in earlier reports. Many of these reports are anecdotal: one judge
extended the offer for only fifteen minutes, another required an immediate
answer, and the like.83 The Study described this problem as systemic: during
the 2000 market on an aggregate basis, 25% of judges required answers with
twenty-four hours; a cumulative 38%, within forty-eight hours; and a
cumulative 68%, within a week. 84 The expectation that applicants would
respond quickly to offers meant that there were advantages to clerks to
armnging their interviews stmtegically. The Study found that "many students
limit the judges to whom they apply to avoid being paired offearly with a less
preferred judge.,,85 One student responded to the 1999 survey confessing:
"[t]hroughout the process I... stmtegize[d] and manipulate[d]... not
75 !d. at 807-12. The authors report very little from the survey of the Supreme Court: only
that members of the Court believe that the appellate clerkship market is a "mess," but that the
Supreme Court market is not affected because the Justices receive many more applications from fully
qualified candidates than there are positions. /d. at 876-77. The authors infer from this response that
the Supreme Court might be amenable to compelling a medical match program in the appellate market
as a condition of application for a Supreme Court clerkship. Id The authors' match proposal is
discussed infra text accompanying notes 116-124.
76 Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at 813.
77 See id. at 813-34.
78 Id. at 814 tbl.l.
79 See id.
80 See id at 814 tbl.2.
81 Id. at 817.
82 Id.at817tbl.5.
83 !d. at 818 tbl.7.
84 Id. at 818 tbl.6.
85 Id. at 813.
136
HeinOnline -- 22 Yal J. on Reg. 137 2005
Reexamining the Market for Judicial Clerks
answering the telephone for rear of being trapped into a less-than-ideal interview
early on, and trying to arrange interviews strategically ....,,86
But judges behaved strategically as well in scheduling interviews and
requiring quick responses, in some cases despite earlier promises to a candidate
to keep the process open to allow the candidate to interview other judges.8?
3) Responses are generally accsmtances. The Study found that 73% of
students accepted the first ofter that they received. 88 Perhaps as a result, 68% of
students only received one offi:r;89 a cumulative 93% received only two offers.90
These findings demonstrated to the authors that "the law clerk market does not
appear to be one in which students have the opportunity to consider a range of
options before making their decisions.,,91 The Study also found, more
alarmingly, that the first ofter was the "flIst-choice position" of only 34% of
students and not the first-choice of 66%.92 Of that 66%, more than half, 58%,
had nonetheless accepted it. 93 Thus, in aggregate, 38% of responding students
accepted offers from other than their flIst-choice judge. 94 Many of the students
provided explanations for their decisions. As the authors characterize them,
they reflect "the strong student aversion to sacrificing a 'bird in the hand' for
. d th d ,,95uncertam prospects own e roa .
4) Subsequent interviews are canceled. The Study found that 79% of
judges during the 1999 market and 66% during 2000 had subsequently-
scheduled interviews canceled by students. 96 The authors interpret this fmding,
along with the finding that students receive early oflers from "non-top-choice
judges" as demonstrating that "applicants are missing the chance to consider
what might be more preferred altematives.,,97
The authors conclude that these various findings demonstrate the
inefficient operation of the clerkship market. Perhaps the clearest finding in this
regard is the substantial number (38%) of students who accept offers from other
than their first-choice judge. The authors describe the other findings, however,
as also providing confirmation of inefficiency. The early oflers, early
acceptances, and cancellations of subsequent interviews show that the clerkship
86 Id. at 821 (alteration in original).
81 Id. at 819-20.
88 Id. at 821 tbl.8.
89 That is, at least 5 % received a second offer after accepting the first offer.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 820.
92 Id. at 823, tbl. 9.
93 Id.
94 Derived by author. Note that the Harvard-Chicago Study did not inquire of the 27% who
declined their first offer from a judge not their first choice whether they ever received an offer from
their first-choice judge.
95 Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 1, at 824.
96 Id. at 826, 821, tbl. I I.
91 ld. at 826.
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market is not one in which both clerks and judges are presented a wide range of
alternatives before making their choices. 98 And the problems with the market
are accelerating. The Study found that 57% of judges in 2000 were conducting
interviews and extending offers earlier than they had in the preceding year.99
Finally, the Study also uncovered data that suggested the clerkship market
operated in a way that participants in the market could regard as being
substantively unfair. IOO Because of the "frenzied manner and early timing of
hiring," some judges were led to rely on "various forms of personal well-
connectedness" in selecting clerks. 101 As examples, some judges (or their
clerks) seek information from an applicant's current classmates (i.e., a
classmate also applying to the judge) or from recent law school graduates who
are clerks. 102 In addition, some faculty members are given a position as a
"clerkship broker," encouraging connections between a judge and a student
beyond simply submitting a general recommendation. 103 The Study uncovered
"various [other] forms of social well-connectedness, including connections with
friends of a judge or a judge's former clerks.,,104 Although the authors avoided
taking the position that these forms of connections were substantively unfair,105
they did show that some participants regarded them as unfair. 106
The Harvard-Chicago Study, as mentioned, is the most thorough and
extensive examination of the market for judicial clerks that has yet been
conducted. As certainly might be expected, the authors interpreted the Study's
findings to support reform of the clerkship market. Prior to setting forth reform
proposals, however, the authors situated the market for judicial clerks in the
context of other markets with timin§ peculiarities, building on the work of one
of them, Professor Alvin E. Roth. I 7 I will discuss Professor Roth's work in
the next Section. It should be remembered, however, that the authors' reform
proposals derive from a fur greater range of studies of markets with timing
problems than only the clerkship market. As mentioned, and as will be
discussed more extensively next, Professor Roth categorizes markets with
timing problems into four stages: stage 1, an unregulated market with
unraveling; stage 2, markets with regulations specifying ofl.er times; stage 3,
markets with centralized market clearing procedures (such as thc medical
98 See id. at 813.
99 Id. at 831 tb1.13.
100 The Harvard-Chicago Study, of course, also uncovered many responses from judges
and students complaining about the lack of order and dignity in the process. See id. at 835 tb1.15; 838-
40 tbls.17-1, 17-2.
101 !d. at 840.
102 Id. at 840-41, 898 tbl.AlO.
103 Id. at 843-44, 900-02 tbl.A 12.
104 Id. at 844.
105 !d. at 840.
106 !d. at 845.
107 !d. at 845-58 (discussing Professor Roth's work).
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match); and stage 4, markets with centralized mechanisms, but in which
unraveling occurs prior to operation of the centralized market-matching
mechanism. Stage 4 markets require even greater regulation beyond the
introduction of the matching system. As we shall see, Professor Roth's four-
stage analysis informs the authors' recommendations for reform of the clerkship
market.
3. The Harvard-Chicago Recommendations
Following the report of the Study's fmdings, the authors considered four
basic forms that the clerkship market might take: a) an unregulated free market;
b) a market with established start dates; c) a market determined by a mandatory
medical match mechanism; and d) a market with a modified medical match
mechanism, applicable only to judges who want their clerks to be considered
for Supreme Court clerkships.
a. Leave the Market Unregulated
The authors rejected maintenance of an unregulated free market (Professor
Roth's stage I). Without regulation, "[h]iring will continue to occur in a
frenzied manner and is likely to move back even further in the student's law
school career, so that even less information is available."lo8 Further
information-such as when specific judges expect to begin hiring-would aid
such a market, but the authors viewed the prognosis of such a market as
" . ~,109gnm.
b. Set Fixed Start Dates for Market Transactions110
The authors rejected further attempts to reform the market by setting fixed
dates for interviews and offurs (Professor Roth's stage 2). According to the
authors, where these reforms have been introduced in the clerkship market, they
fuiled; they have also been attempted in markets for medical residencies, college
football bowls, and clinical psychology positions, among others, equally
fuiling. (The Harvard-Chicago Study, of course, was published prior to the
appellate moratorium of 2002-04.) Even where start dates are complied with,
they creatc serious problems of transaction congestion because market
transactions are compressed into a much shorter time period. More generally,
however, there are strong incentives for participants to defect from the start
dates in order to gain an advantage on their competitors. The authors consider
108 Id. at 861.
109 Id. at 861-62.
110 See id at 862-68, for the Harvard-Chicago Study discussion sununarized here.
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a palliative: "limiting the information available to judges prior to the start
date. Making it more difficult for judges to gather information will impede their
ability to move early ....,,111 But the authors despair that even this reform is
likely to fail; moreover, even if successful, it will not solve the insuperable
problem of transaction congestion at the start dates themselves. Again, to the
authors, the prognosis of a market constrained only by start dates is "grim.,,112
c. Adopt a Centralized Transaction Mechanism Like the Medical
Match113
The medical match (Professor Roth's stage 3) brings together students
about to graduate from medical school applying for a wide range of medical
residencies with the hospitals that manage residency programs. Following
interviews, both applicants and hospitals register for the match and submit
rank-ordered lists of preferences-the applicants for preferred hospitals; the
hospitals for preferred applicants. On a fixed date, a centralized computer
program matches these prefurences: i.e., if a hospital's fIrst choice applicant has
listed the hospital as its fIrst choice, they are matched; if a hospital's second
choice applicant has not been matched with his or her fIrst choice, but has
listed the hospital as the second choice, they are matched; and so on.
The medical match model deals with the problem of transaction
congestion at the hiring date but, according to the authors, engenders still other
problems. The most signifIcant is that, despite the matching program, parties
fuce incentives to cheat on the match by entering agreements prior to the date of
the match-{)pen or tacit-that inform the rank-orderings they submit to the
match. According to the authors, it is estimated that 10% to 15% of medical
students (and of course the corresponding hospitals) cheat on the medical
residency match in this way.114 The authors are concerned that, given the much
smaller market for judicial clerks, cheating is likely to be more prevalent which
would make adoption alone ofa match "highly problematic.,,115
d. Adopt a ModifIed Medical Match Programl16
Finally, the authors recommended adoption of what they call a modifIed
medical match (Professor Roth's stage 4). As discussed, the pure medical
match possesses flaws because it cannot itself prohibit cheating. In addition, as
the authors frankly admit, many judges would object to it. Their surveys of
III [d. at 867.
112 Id. at 863.
113 See id. at 868-871, for the Harvard-Chicago Study discussion summarized here.
114 Id at 870.
115 Id at 870-71.
116 See id. at 871-77, 883-84, for the Harvard-Chicago Study discussion swnmarized here.
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appellate judges uncovered many who, like Judge Kozinski, endorsed
maintaining the market without regulation, either because they believed
themselves to be effective in competition or were unaflected by the congestion
and early hiring pressures objected to by others. I 17 These judges would oppose
adoption of a matching program, and are of sufficient number to defeat such a
118proposal.
In response to this problem, the authors proposed a modified medical
match according to which participation in the match would only be mandatory
for those judges who want their clerks to be subsequently considered for
Supreme Court clerkships. The logic of their proposal is this: According to the
authors there are two groups of judges: "those who are engendering the
problems in the market" by early interviewing and early offers; and the rest of
the judges who perceive no problems with the market because they proceed
more leisurely in hiring clerks. 1l9 The fIrst set, those causing the problems, are
judges who are more likely to want the prestige that attends "feeding" clerks to
the Supreme Court. Making the match mandatory for those judges would, in
essence, segregate the miscreants from the rest of the clerkship market. 120 The
other attraction of the proposal is that, however limited the authority of the
Judicial Conference or, surely, of ad hoc committees of judges, the Supreme
Court possesses the authority over the judicial system to order introduction of
a mandatory match for applicants (and the judges who want them as appellate
clerks) who want to be later considered for Supreme Court clerkships.121
Still, as explained above, the authors fear that even matching programs
may be attended by cheating: informal arrangements confIrming preferences
prior to the submission of rank order listings to the match mechanism
(Professor Roth's stage 4). The authors proposed dealing with this problem by
introducing "a small degree of randomization in the match to destabilize the
informal understandings.,,122 More precisely, the matching program will
prohibit judges and applicants from entering agreements or understandings with
regard to the preference list they submit to the match. Yet, if some threshold of
non-compliance is detected, according to the authors, say, 1% of candidates,
"then it could be announced that 5% (for example) of applicants would have
117 Id. at 873-75 tb1.22.
118 Again. in a 1989 survey of appellate judges, only one-third approved adoption of a
medical matching program. Becker et aI., supra note 20, at 222.
119 Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at 872.
120 Jd. at 871-84.
121 As mentioned, supra note 75, the chief finding that the authors report from their survey
of Supreme Court Justices is that the Justices don't like the appearance of the appellate market, but
feel they have no particular problems finding well-qualified clerks. The authors interpret this absence
of concern as opening the possibility for the Supreme Court to mandate a match on the grounds that
the Supreme Court will receive able applications, match or not. Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7,
at 876-77.
122 Id.at883.
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their first and second choices randomized in the centralized match.,,123 This
penalty would deter informal agreements directly, and also provide grounds for
one party, reluctant to enter an informal agreement, to rebuff the invitation of
124
another party to cheat.
To date, the recommendations of the Harvard-Chicago Study have not
been adopted. Nevertheless, as mentioned in the introduction, following the
publication of the Harvard-Chicago Study in 2001, fervor to reform the
clerkship market was rekindled. An ad hoc committee of federal judges
succeeded in securing an agreement among the appellate judiciary upon a one-
year moratorium on the submission of applications and recommendations until
after Labor Day which went into effect in 2003 and has recently been extended
to 2004. As mentioned, the authors of the Harvard-Chicago Study predicted
substantial transaction congestion following such a start date that they believed
would outweigh the gains from the existence of greater information about
applicants. 125 Many judges appear to have complained about the congestion
problem in 2003 which led the Ad Hoc Committee to propose for 2004 a two-
week "reading period" between the receipt of applications and the beginning of
. . 126llltervlews.
C. The Broader Context ofMarket Unraveling
As mentioned, both the Harvard-Chicago Study analysis of unraveling in
the market for judicial clerks and the Study's reform recommendations were
informed by the analysis of unraveling in a wide range ofother markets by one
of the Study's co-authors, Professor Roth. 127 In an extensive series of papers
published over the past two decades, Professor Roth has demonstrated that a
diverse set of markets, ancient and modem, have su:ffi::red problems in the
timing of market transactions. 128 The vast majority of the markets that
Professor Roth identifies involve entry-level professionals, though he presents
many other examples including medieval commodity markets.
According to Professor Roth, the timing problems in these markets lead
to "potentially large losses of efficiency.... In virtually all of these markets,
the problems originate with the incentives that some market participants have
to try to 'jump the gun,' and arrange transactions just a little earlier than their
123 !d.
124 !d.
125 Id. at 868.
126 See 2004 PLAN, supra note 5.
127 The Harvard-Chicago Study reproduces and discusses Professor Roth's findings.
Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at 845-58.
128 His central paper, from which most of this discussion derives, is Roth & Xing, supra note
11.
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competitors.,,129 In most of the markets, the unraveling of transaction times
"often occurred despite the vigorous efforts of market participants to halt it due
to the costs it imposed .... ,,130 These costs are the "costs of having to hire in
anticipation of uncertain future need, costs of potential mismatches caused by
the uncertainty of employees' qualifications before they had completed their
training, and the increased costs of search and loss of liquidity as the variance
in times of appointment increased.,,131
Professor Roth presents a simple model illustrating the problem. Imagine
that there is some final period T (such as graduation from school) and earlier
periods, T - 1, T - 2, and the like, at which earlier transactions may be made.
The "worker w at time T is an agent with certain attributes, but ... at time T
- 1, before the attributes are known, the workers can be identified only as
members of [a] set... [possessing] a probability distribution... over
possible attributes.,,132 By definition, transaction times will "unmvel whenever
it is not an equilibrium for all contracts. .. to be signed at time T.,,133
According to the Roth analysis, there are three principal reasons that this
unraveling might occur:
1) Instability in matching at time T (e.g., congestion in the last
moments of a uniform timing regime, or an unstable centralized
market-clearing mechanism). "If the uncertainty at time T - 1 is
sufficiently small compared to the cost of being mismatched, then
such agents have an incentive to make their transactions early to
avoid the unstable institutions at time T.,,134
2) Risk preference by some participants. If "some participants ...
prefer [ ] arrang[ing] their transactions before some uncertainties
are resolved," they may enter transactions at time T - 1,
"forc[ing] other participants to move early also.,,135
3) Differential market power as between time T and time T - 1, i.e.,
where a worker believes that he or she would be in a superior
competitive position at time T - 1 than at time T, given different
competing participants in the market. 136
Note that the unraveling on account of participant risk preference or
differential market power can occur despite the existence of a stable market-
clearing mechanism that optimally matches participants at time T. Note also
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
the worker.
Roth & Xing, supra note II, at 992.
ld. at 994.
ld.
ld. at 1031.
ld. at 1029.
ld.
ld. at 1030.
ld. This proposition of the Roth model would apply equally to the finn considering hiring
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that, in the Roth model, the concept of optimal match consists of an optimal
ordinal match as between workers and finns. An ordinal match is one in which
a worker is matched with its first-choice finn where that worker was the first-
choice of the firm; subsequently, second-choices are matched with second-
choices (because their respective first-choices were otherwise matched with their
first-choice matches), and so on. Given this formulation of the model, it is
obvious why Professor Roth and his followers so strongly advocate the
introduction of centralized matching mechanisms, such as the medical
residency match, since ordinal matching is exactly what those mechanisms can
accomplish. Similarly, given that the objective is to devise a mechanism to
generate an optimal ordinal match, it is evident why Professor Roth is critical
of activities that lead to earlier agreements, because they render moot the
operation of the subsequent computer match. Professor Roth views such
activities as unfortunate because any agreement reached outside the operation of
the centralized matching mechanism introduces a risk of sub-optimality. 137
Professor Roth categorizes markets affected by unraveling into four
separate stages. To Professor Roth, a stage 1 market
begins when the market comes into being... and the relatively few
transactions are made without overt timing problems. By the middle of stage
I the market has grown, and some appointments are being made rather early,
with some participants finding that they do not have as wide a range of
choices as they would like .... The trade journals start to be full of
exhortations urging employers to wait until the traditional time to make
offers, or at least not to make them any earlier next year than this year.
Toward the end of stage 1, the rate of unraveling accelerates, until sometimes
quite suddenly offers are being made so early that there are serious
difficulties in distinguishing among the candidates.... As stage 1 ends,
influential market participants are engaged in a vigorous debate about what
can and should be done. From beginning to end, stage 1 may have covered a
period ofmore than fifty years, or fewer than ten. 138
A stage 2 market, in contrast, is one in which there are attempts to
establish uniform dates before which offers should not be made and sometimes
limits imposed on interviews. 139 Yet,
[e]ven when uniform dates are successfully established and maintained, the
market often experiences a great deal of congestion and chaotic behavior, as
the deadline for accepting or rejecting offers grows near.... Finns whose
first-choice candidates reject them may now find that their next dozen
candidates have already accepted offers, and candidates may receive preferred
offers moments after making a verbal commitment to accept an earlier offer....
[I]n the aftermath, many finns and candidates have just missed making
137 This point explains the concerns of the authors of the Harvard-Chicago Study about
cheating on their recommended appellate match which they hoped to deter by randomizing portions of
the match. See supra text accompanying notes 122-124.
138 Roth & Xing, supra note II, at 996.
139 !d.
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connections they would have preferred. The result is that the following year
witnesses a resurgence of strategic behaviors designed to avoid being
caught short at the end of the market.... While some markets have persisted
for many seasons in this fashion, systems of formalized dates are often
abandoned, with the market either reverting to stage I, or moving on to140
stage 3.
Stage 3 involves the creation of a centralized market-clearing procedure. 141
Interviews remain decentralized, but all offers and acceptances occur through a
centralized mechanism, rather than by the parties directly. 142 According to
Professor Roth, centralized mechanisms are not always successful; sometimes,
the mechanism is abandoned and the market reverts to stage 1.143 In other
contexts, "stage 3 may be the final stage in the market's evolution. However
144
some ofthese markets go on to stage 4."
Finally, a stage 4 market is one with a centralized matching mechanism
in place, but where unraveling occurs in periods before operation of the
mechanism. 145 In these markets, despite the existence of the centralized
mechanism, "the unraveling has often taken the form of recruiting students for
summer internships (or in the case of some medical specialties for 'audition
electives'), which amount to extensive interviewing opportunities in which the
student spends a period of weeks or even months at the fmn.,,146
Here, the unraveling does not eliminate all of the benefits of the
centralized match, because the match can still fucilitate transactions where fmns
need to hire applicants who did not serve the internship.147 This continued
benefit of the centralized mechanism distinguishes stage 4 unraveling from that
in stage I, where all transactions were decentralized. 148
Professor Roth presents many examples of markets characteristic of each of
his four stages.
1. Stage I Markets
The best example of a stage 1 market, characterized by substantial
unraveling, is the market for American federal judicial clerks, extensively
discussed by Professor Roth. 149 A second example is entry-level hiring in the
140 Id.
141 Id. at 996-97.
142 Id. at 997.
143 ld.
144 !d.
145 !d.
146 !d.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 1001-04.
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best American law finns, an important case because it is a market with
substantial competition over salaries. 150 According to Professor Roth,
competition in this market has not been confined to wages. The market has
also experienced serious unraveling, in many ways parallel to that
experienced in the judicial clerkship market, but with important differences
as well.]n particular, much of the unraveling has come in the recruitment and
hiring of students for summer positions as "summer associates." ... [T]he
competition to recruit and hire the most promising summer associates has
become a proxy for entry-level hiring. 151
A third example of stage 1 unraveling that led to inefficient matching was
the process for the allocation of college football teams to bowls prior to
adoption of the current Bowl Championship Series (B.C.S.) mechanism. 152
Professor Roth illustrates the unraveling problem by describing the selection of
teams by nineteen post-season bowls at the end of the 1990-91 season. To
prevent unraveling, the NCAA had designated a particular date as "Pick-em
Day," just before the final two games of each team's season. Bowl sponsors
violated the restriction, however, some selecting teams almost two weeks
before. As a consequence, the teams ranked number one and number two at the
end of the season played against different opponents in diffurent bowl games, to
Professor Roth an illustration of inefficient matching.
Finally, Professor Roth presents examples of entry-level hiring markets
not characterized by serious unravelin~: entry-level MBA graduates and
business school marketing professors. 15 Professor Roth, however, cannot
explain why unraveling in these markets is "regarded as being of manageable
. ,,154proportIOns.
2. Stage 2 Markets
Stage 2 markets are those in which uniform hiring dates are set, but where
the market is plagued by congestion and mismatches at the time of ultimate
transaction. One example is the market for Japanese university graduates where
a series of agreements are entered by finns through various employer's
federations, university associations, and government ministries that attempt to
set fixed recruiting and ofrer dates. 155 According to Professor Roth, these
agreements have been unsuccessful because of early recruiting. 156 A second
ISO [d. at 1004-07.
lSI !d. at 1004-05.
152 See id. at 1007-13 for the Roth and Xing discussion of bowl games. Their paper was
published before the institution of the current ReS., see infra text accompanying notes 299-301,
though that mechanism is clearly in the spirit ofProfessor Roth's analysis.
153 Roth & Xing, supra note II,at 1013-14.
154 [d.
155 [d. at 1014-16.
156 [d.
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example is the market for clinical psychology interns, where time limitations
have been introduced, also unsuccessfully. IS?
3. Stage 3 Markets
Stage 3 markets are those in which a centralized market-elearing
mechanism has been adopted. Here are Professor Roth's best examples, chiefly
entry-level medical positions, in which different medical specialty associations,
both in the United States and in England, have adopted the medical match
(such as the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) through which
hospitals and aspiring residents are matched. 158 Professor Roth has been both a
strong advocate of the adoption of medical match-like programs and the
designer of many of those programs. 159 Professor Roth has also studied college
fraternities and sororities which have adopted such matchin~ programs to
control unraveling, called "rushing," in membership recruiting. I 0
4. Stage 4 Markets
Stage 4 markets are those in which some centralized matching mechanism
has been adopted, but where unraveling occurs nonetheless. Professor Roth
presents several examples of medical markets characterized by this unraveling.
One such market comprises hospitals at "the least competitive end" that find
that they are unable to fill all their resident positions through the NRMP
match. 161 According to Professor Roth, "[i]t appears that some of the hospitals
that regularly fail to fill all their positions have begun to recruit foreign medical
162graduates before the match."
Conversely, among the most competitive hospitals, several specialties
"have begun to suggest to applicants that they must take part in audition
electives if they wish to be seriously considered as candidates for
residencies.,,163 An "audition elective" requires on-site work in the hospital's
clinic for a period of several weeks, and is a way for the hospital to learn the
abilities of the candidate and the candidate to learn about the hospital. 164
According to Professor Roth, in a 1991 survey, 80% of students interested in
orthopedic surgery or neuro-surgery reported that they had been told by a
IS7 [d. a11016-18.
158 [d. at 1018-22.
159 Jd
160 Jd at 1019-20.
161 [d. at 1023.
162 [d.
163 [d.
164 [d.
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program that they were more likely to be highly ranked in the match if they
participated in an audition elective with that program. 165
Professor Roth has found similar unraveling in the market for articling
lawyers in Canada. As a condition for· admission to a provincial bar
association, a Canadian law school graduate is required to spend ten months
"articling"-working as a non-admitted associate-in a Canadian law finn. In
1986, the law association in Ontario adopted a matching program like the
medical match for law fJnns and articling students. l66 Over time, however, there
has been "a tendency toward unraveling" as law students have felt advantaged
by working in a law fum during the summers after their first and second years,
giving both the fJnns and the students advance infonnation about each other for
the purpose of the rank-order selection in the match. 167
5. Other Markets with Unraveling·
Finally, Professor Roth has identified a miscellaneous set of markets that
appear to experience timing problems, inferred chiefly from the observation of
fOnTIS of regulation that have been adopted to control hiring transactions. One
is the market for entry-level professional athletes in which various sports
leagues have adopted organized dmfts, allocating sequential choices to teams in
. d f h ' . th· 168Illverse or er 0 t e team s success III e prevIOUS season.
A second set of markets of this nature is medieval and modem commodity
markets. Many medieval markets were controlled by statutes or town bylaws
that prohibited "forestalling": selling goods before they reached the open and
organized market. 169 Professor Roth presents other medieval examples in which
sales outside of the primary markets were disallowed. 170
Finally, Professor Roth gives the example of the facts in the famous U.S.
antitrust case, Chicago Board of Trade. 17I There, the Board of Tmde had
designated a particular period of time-named the "call" period-during which
members would trade for the purchase and sale of grain in transit to Chicago. 172
The members of the Board of Tmde adopted a rule preventing members from
tmding "to arrive" grain during the time from the end of the call period to the
beginning of the next business day's general trading session at any price other
165
166
167
168
169
(1931».
170
171
172
148
Id.
ld at 1024.
[d. at 1024-25.
[d. at 1025-26.
[d. at 1027 (citing loUIS F. SALZMAN, ENGLISH TRADE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 75-76
Id. at 1028 n.68 (citing SALZMAN, supra note 169, at 132-33).
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
[d. at 236.
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than the closing price at the end of the call period. 173 The U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that the restriction was a reasonable means of creating a market. '74 To
Professor Roth, the practice is another example of a market in which it became
I .. . 175necessary to regu ate transactIOn tImmg.
Professor Roth's work has been notable in identifying a feature of market
operation-the timing of market transactions-largely neglected in the
economic study of markets. His work has been widely influential. This paper
will analyze in more detail each of Professor Roth's examples of unraveling. 176
Next, however, this paper presents a somewhat different economic analysis of
the problem.
II. A Different Approach Toward the Timing of Market Transactions
This Part presents a different analysis of markets with timing peculiarities.
Section A presents the economic analysis and applies it to the market fur
judicial clerks. Section B reevaluates the results of the Harvard-Chicago Study.
Section C discusses the curious experience of Yale Law School, which has
viewed itself as particularly disabled in the clerkship market because of its
ungraded first semester, unique among law schools. Finally, Section D
addresses the other markets that Professor Roth has identified that are said to
possess timing problems.
A. Markets with Timing Peculiarities from the Vantage of Market Search
Professor Roth and those writing in what I will call the Roth tradition
(including the authors of the Harvard-Chicago Study) begin their analysis with
a focus on a particular market for which an optimal moment for market
transactions can be specified. Entry-level labor markets in law, medicine,
sports, or other industries fit this description because workers enter these
markets following the completion of some level of schooling or preparation.
Similarly, since college bowl games are played only at the end of a football
season, the bowl game market can be said to begin at the end of the season.
Having specified an optimal time for a market to begin, the Roth tradition then
addresses the subject: why are market transactions occurring at times other than
at that optimal moment?
From a different standpoint, however, the subject of the timing of market
transactions is a peculiar one. Consider the subject of timing from the vantage
of the participants in the market and of the determinants of market search in
173 !d. at 237.
174 !d. at 239-41.
175 Roth & Xing, supra note II, at 1028.
176 See infra Section 11.0.
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contexts of impetfect information. Since the work of George Stigler, it has been
well accepted that a market participant can be expected to continue to search for
a product as long as the net expected returns from further investments in search
" 111 M k' b dare pOSItiVe. ar et transactlOns occur-a consumer uys a pro uct at a
particular time-when the marginal benefit net of costs from further search
becomes zero or, put slightly difterently, when the marginal costs of obtaining
further information about the product exceed the marginal expected gains from
acquisition of that information.
Most (though not all) of the markets described and analyzed by Professor
Roth are two-sided markets in which both buyers (say, employers) and sellers
(workers) are engaged in the search process. 118 This fact slightly complicates,
but does not change, the basic analysis of search. It simply means that search
by both parties will continue until both parties have concluded that the net
benefits from further search are exhausted. The parties, of course, will need to
mutually agree in order to enter the transaction. One party may be ready to
trarlsact, having concluded that expected benefits from further search have been
exhausted, while the other party may choose to engage in further search. Again,
this is a complication, but does not change the analysis. The market
trarlsaction will occur at the time when both parties have concluded that the
costs offurther search exceed expected benefits.
Another potential distinction between the markets that Professor Roth
examines and more typical commodity markets is the level of uncertainty
attending the transaction. The entry-level employment markets that form the
focus of Professor Roth's work are attended by potentially high levels of
uncertainty on both sides. Employers, for example, may be very uncertain as to
the future productivity of potential workers; workers may be uncertain as to the
quality of the job they will be able to obtain at later times in the market. 179 But
this difference is surely no more than a matter of degree. All markets are
attended by some level of uncertainty concerning price or quality of the
product. Unless hopelessly compulsive, none of us can ever be certain that we
have canvassed every potential product that might meet some current need, or
that there is not some seller somewhere from whom we might buy the product
at a better price. Again, at some point, a buyer even of a simple commodity
must make a judgment as to whether further market search is worth the trouble;
177 George J. Stigler, The Economics ofInformation, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961), reprinred
in THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 171 (1968).
178 The medieval and modern commodity markets he discusses are simple one-sided
markets.
179 This feature of these markets is emphasized in Li & Rosen, supra note 1I. According to
the Li-Rosen analysis, unraveling in labor markets is a market failure resulting from the absence of
Arrow-Debreu securities markets for human capital. The unraveling, thus, is motivated by risk
aversion; early contracting serves as a form of insurance against adverse placement at later times in
the market.
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this is the economic calculation. Differences in transaction time across buyers
reflect diffurences in search costs or in their evaluation of these uncertainties.
That one individual is a decisive shopper who buys a product after limited
search, while another visits multiple stores and the Internet, means only that
the economic determinants of market search are different for the two.
Viewed this way, the question of the appropriate timing of market
transactions becomes a straightforward matter. The timing of transactions in
any market is a function of the relationship between the costs and benefits of
further search to market participants. Transactions take place when the costs of
further search exceed expected benefits and, therefore, are a function of the
determinants of those costs. This is not to make the subject uninteresting. As
Stigler has shown, there will be greater expected benefits from continued search
as there is greater price or quality dispersion in the market. 180 And, of course,
the determinants of search costs, such as the value of time, the costs of
obtaining information, the level of risk aversion deriving from expected
uncertainty, and the like, remain of economic importance and interest. The
ultimate resolution of the timing question, however, will still be determined
by the intersection of the curve defining the value offurther information and the
curve defining search costs.
As mentioned, in Professor Roth's work, the timing of transactions
appears as a more prominent issue because the markets he has studied can be
defined as "beginning" at particular moments. Thus, entry-level employment
markets can be defined as "beginning" only after the moment of graduation
from a high school, college, or professional school. Other of the markets that
Professor Roth analyzes possess similar potential defining points. One can
define the market for college football bowl games as beginning after the end of
the football season or on the date that the NCAA designates as "Pick-em Day."
Medieval markets were often defined to occur on specific days in specific
locations. The Chicago Board of Trade, like other commodity and stock
markets, designates fixed hours of operation. As I shall discuss, many of the
markets Professor Roth has studied have been subjected to some form of
regulation of transaction timing. In these markets, the regulation defines-or, at
least, attempts to define-the time the market begins.
It is the existence of a specific day or moment that can be identified as the
point at which the market begins that gives the concept of unraveling its
coherence. In the Roth tradition, unraveling consists of market transactions that
occur at times earlier than the optimal market beginning time. It is quite
another matter, however, to attach normative significance to the unraveling
concept. The Roth tradition uniformly regards unraveling as a problem, a
disturbance, an obstacle to the achievement of efficient market transactions. As
180 Stigler, supra note 177, at 171-75.
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a consequence, the nonnative approach of the tradition is to subject markets
characterized by early transactions to some form of timing regulation such as by
the adoption of a centralized matching program; if the market is regulated, but
early transactions still occur, the Roth tradition proposes more extensive
regulation. Given the existence of regulation, the nonnative condemnation of
unraveling may be defensible. Instances of unraveling mean that the timing
regulation is being violated. But the question is more complicated for markets
without regulation as well as for regulated markets where the question is
whether the regulation can be defended.
As a general matter, the concept of an optimal beginning date of a market
is an artifact and is inconsistent with the economic model of market search.
This is apparent from many of the markets that Professor Roth studies, though
the point is a broader one. For example, in his description of the market for
college football bowl games, Professor Roth defines unraveling as the entering
of market transactions prior to the NCAA's Pick-em date. lSI But the Pick-em
date was simply a date chosen by some process by the NCAA; it preceded the
end of the football season by several games. If the end of the season is the
optimal moment for the market, the Pick-em date itself constitutes unraveling.
Similarly, for the market for judicial clerks, unraveling is defined as the
extension and acceptance of offers prior to the beginning of a student's third
year of law school. But why is it optimal to transact for clerkships at the
beginning rather than at the end of the student's third year when all the
student's law school grades will have been recorded?
When considering markets from the standpoint of market search in the
context of costly information, it is not evident that there is a single beginning
time for market transactions that is optimal in any sense. Market transactions
occur when the parties believe that they possess sufficient infonnation-relative
to the costs of obtaining further information-to enter the deal. Imagine, for
example, the market for high school graduates who have decided not to proceed
to college. This market is not inconsiderable. In 1999, 2,897,000 persons
graduated from U.S. high schools. ls2 Of this number, 62.9%-1,822,213-
proceeded to college;IS3 the remainder, 1,074,787, entered the entry-level job
market. It is possible, as with other levels of education, to characterize the
market for high school graduates as beginning on the date of high school
graduation. But what do we make of unraveling from that beginning time?
Consider a high school student, confident that college is not for him or her
(because expected net benefits are negative), and who knows that he or she will
need a job after graduation. The student may surely engage in job search, may
181 See Roth & Xing, supra note 11, at 1007-13.
182 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2001, at 164 tbl.
262.
183 Jd.
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try out jobs-during summers or after school part-time or full-time-that
might be attractive as a career and, if fortunate, might succeed in securing an
attractive job prior to graduation by demonstrating his or her abilities to an
employer. By the definitions with which we have been working, this is
evidence of unraveling in the high school job market, but is it a sign of a
problem in the market?
The analytical point does not depend on the high school example.
Imagine a college student certain that the costs of graduate or professional
education are greater than expected benefits. When this student pursues future
job interests by learning about industries or alternative potential careers or,
perhaps again, secures a job offer or expectation based on summer work, is it
useful to view the college job market as unraveling? The point extends to
professional job markets analyzed by Professor Roth. At several law schools at
which I have taught, securing a part-time job with a law firm, thus increasing
the prospects of future employment (or securing a volunteer job as a clerk for a
judge), was possible for only the very best and most able students, though was
an aspiration of the entire student body. At what point is it useful to regard the
market for legal Careers beginning? The concept of unraveling and the welfure
implications of its existence require some further clarification.
In order to see more clearly what is distinctive about some of the markets
that Professor Roth has studied and in order to more carefully understand what
might be called unraveling, it is helpful to compare job markets without
unraveling to markets, like the market for judicial clerks, that operate
substantially diffurently. Professor Roth does not claim that all markets---even
entry-level labor markets-are characterized by unraveling. For example, he
concedes that there is little unraveling in entry-level markets for MBAs,184 and
nor has he discovered unraveling in a wide range of other entry-level labor
markets. 185 Many of these markets are considerable and are surely complex. In
2000, for example, 112,258 graduate students received MBAs and entered the
job market,186 securing jobs, surely, at many thousands of diffurent employers.
What distinguishes markets of this nature from the market for judicial clerks?
In most labor markets, there are many dimensions that define the relative
attractiveness of different jobs, which is to say, there are many dimensions over
which employers compete for employees. In diffurent jobs, salaries will differ;
future wage tracks will diffi:r; working conditions will differ; the extent to
184 Roth & Xing, supra note 11, at 1013-14.
185 Id. As broadly as he defmes unraveling-to include the pre-cornrnitment acquisition of
infonnation-I would expect that he is probably wrong in this respect, and that these labor markets
would indicate "unraveling" according to his definition, at the minimum in the form of the acquisition
of substantial infonnation prior to graduation through summer jobs that resemble audition electives in
surgery.
I86 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2002, at 177
tb1.280 [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTACT 2002].
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which the job can be expected to contribute to development of the worker's
human capital will differ through the nature of the job or through differential
assignments; stability of future employment will differ; and of course, there are
geographic differences. In all of these dimensions, candidates will sort
themselves into jobs throughout the market as they differentially evaluate these
fuctors given the job offers that they receive. Over time, employers will adjust
various dimensions of the jobs they offer-by changing starting salaries or
changing working conditions-in response to demand and supply changes in
the labor market. These continuous adjustments in the price and quality of
employment allow these labor markets to clear.
The market for judicial clerks is substantially different. The clerkship
market is distinctively more truncated in most of these dimensions of job
choice. Although individual judges will have different temperaments and will
work their clerks more or less intensively, job conditions themselves are
fungible over a large range. The content of the workload may diffur somewhat
across circuits, though in ways uncontrollable among judges of the same
circuit. In many other respects, however, there are no differences across
appellate clerkships. Salaries are fixed, set by Congress. 187 Geographic
differences are of minimal importance because of the heavy and demanding work
load of the clerkship, though applicants may prefer particular locations on
account of fumily or relationship commitments. Differences in job stability are
infmitesimal; as Judge Wald informed us, clerks are almost never fired. 188
Importantly, the job extends for only a year; two years, at most. Thus, even
where there are differences across clerkships, their expected value is low because
of the short tenure of the job.
Given the absence of difference across these dimensions, one principal
apparent difference among clerkships is in what might be loosely called the
"prestige" or the value of the clerkship which derives from the general
reputation of the judge. As has been mentioned, some judges stand out as
"feeders" to the Supreme Court, though the realistic probability of a Supreme
Court clerkship is low for any appellate clerk. Judge Kozinski reported (and my
experience confirms) that clerkships on the D.C. Circuit are differentially
attractive to applicants. 189 Similarly, clerkships with well-known judges in
other circuits are regarded as relatively more prestigious and, thus, subject to
greater competition among applicants. The greater prestige may derive from the
greater level of competition for these clerkships, indicating that an able judge
has evaluated the applicant as superior to a large set of able competitors. It may
187 Salaries for judicial clerks differ slightly based upon experience and bar admission, but
still are non-negotiable. I am grateful to Judge Richard A. Posner for this observation. The Harvard-
Chicago Study notes the lack of flexibility in clerk salaries. Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at
799 n.14.
188 Wa1d, supra note 6, at 153.
189 See supra text accompanying note 41.
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also relate to future productivity if working for a year for a relatively more able
judge makes the clerk a better lawyer. The prestige of the clerkship, thus, may
well affect the future legal career of the clerk.
There is no negotiation, however, over prestige. The prestige of any
clerkship, deriving from the reputation and ability of the judge, is fixed at the
time of application. In contrast, in other professional job markets, the extent of
negotiation prior to the employment agreement may well differ. In many jobs,
salaries are fixed in the sense that they are announced in advance and are not
subject to negotiation, though in other contexts, negotiation takes place,
especially for the most attractive candidates. Negotiation may more generally
take place over potential future assignments, moving expenses, or other less
central perquisites. Moreover, a form of negotiation occurs over time as
employers adjust starting salaries, job definitions, and working conditions in
response to supply and demand forces in the market. These adjustments, as
well as any express negotiation, allow intensity of preference to be expressed by
the employer for a candidate or set of candidates and by the candidate for the
job.
In contrast, in the market fur judicial clerks, there is and can be no
negotiation, nor is there adjustment over time in job description or working
conditions. Again, salaries are fixed; the location is fixed; the workload is
exogenous and cannot be influenced; the judge's temperament is largely fixed;
the prestige of any single clerkship is a constant. None of these mechanisms are
available for adjustment in order for either the judge or the applicant to register
intensity of preference. In the market for judicial clerkships, an offer from a
judge is a take-it-or-leave-it offer.
There is, however, one dimension that remains subject to adjustment to
market forces-even negotiation-in the market for judicial clerks: the time at
which the clerkship offer is extended. Though a judge cannot offer a higher
salary, cannot change the job description, nor alter general working conditions
in any dimension, the judge can control the timing of the clerkship offer. The
timing of the offer, thus, becomes a term of trade in the clerkship market
transaction. A student registers intensity of preference, first, by applying to the
most fuvored judge or judges with whom the student's application might be
successful. A judge can register intensity of preference for a candidate, in tum,
by offering the candidate a clerkship position early in the process. Since there is
substantial uncertainty attending any clerkship application, no matter how able
and self-confident the candidate, an early offer may have substantial value.
By this analysis, the timing of the offer becomes a principal, perhaps the
principal, currency in clearing the market for judicial clerks. In many respects,
the clerkship market resembles an auction. Research into the quality of the
object of the auction takes place largely prior to the beginning of the market.
All offers are take-it-or-Ieave-it offers. In auctions, however, bidders who value
an object more highly than others can prevail by offering a higher price. Money
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is not an available currency in the market for judicial clerkships, nor are there
other available currencies. In their place, the timing of the ofter becomes the
currency.
In a market in which the dimensions of the terms of trade are so truncated,
one should expect the conduct of the market to be different. Because of the take-
it-or-Ieave-it character of the ultimate transaction, as with an auction, both
judges and clerkship candidates can be expected to engage in substantial pre-
market research in anticipation of the market transaction itself. Thus, it is not
surprising that there are strategic efforts by the parties to obtain the most
desirable matching.
Indeed, the apparent rampant maneuvering by both judges and
applicants-in arranging, as best as possible, a particular sequence of
interviews; in trying to avoid calls from a less-favored judge prior to hearing
from a more-favored; in the often delicate request for additional time for
decision or the demand for an immediate response---{;an be explained by a
further explication of the auction analogy. A market in which multiple judges
are competing for clerks resembles, not a single auction, but a collection of
competing auctions conducted nearly simultaneously. A clerkship applicant
fuces a situation in which he or she must decide, first, to which of the 238
appellate judges applications will be sent,190 knowing that, however unique he
or she may be to family and friends, there will be many other applicants in the
pool with comparable college and law school records. Second, the applicant
must also expect that some and perhaps all of the judges to whom applications
are sent will engage in the early-ofter process. The applicant knows that, if a
clerkship offer is extended and not accepted within a relatively short period, the
judge will move on quickly to other comparable candidates in order not to lose
them to the competition of other judges. This means that, as in an auction, the
applicant must be ready to accept or reject within a limited period of time the
offer of any of the judges to which he or she has applied. But again, the
applicant may be participating, not in a single auction, but in a collection of
auctions operating at the same time. In a market of this nature, one must surely
expect strategic interviewing. Indeed, the substantial efforts of judges and
students to align themselves with the most likely partners to a deal-the
maneuvering-represents a rational and beneficial means to ensure success of
191the mutual search.
This process may appear different than search in more traditional markets,
but the differences are superficial. Again, a judge can be expected to make an
offer at the point when the judge concludes that the marginal value of further
190 Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at 886. Many students will simultaneously apply to
district court judges as back-ups, but this point does not change the basic analysis.
191 Of course, these various features of the clerkship market are likely to obtain at
whatever time the market begins. I discuss Ibis point in more detail infra Section ILD.
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information about the clerk is worth less than its costs. In this market,
however-though it is true in all labor markets and in many other markets as
well l92-the costs offurther search include foregoing the opportunity of securing
the clerk because of intervening rival offers. Although much of the litemture on
the clerkship market has emphasized that judges are extending offers on the
basis of scant information about the student's abilities, the claim is not
generally accurate and neglects the economic dimension of the subject. Even at
the beginning of a student's second year of law school, the student will have
established a substantial record to serve as a basis for evaluation. The student
will have been admitted to a college of some reputation, created a college
record, engaged in employment over college summers, taken the LSATs, been
admitted to a law school of some reputation, have received some number of law
school grades, and had one summer of usually law-related work. The student
will also have been interviewed by the judge and the judge's clerks and may
have been able to provide recommendations from college or law school faculty.
There is no coherent economic sense in which an outside party can claim that
this information is insufficient. Jf the information is sufficient enough that a
judge would extend a clerkship offer, it is economically sufficient.
The complaint that this information is an inadequate grounds for hiring,
at base, is an empirical assertion that there is a net marginal benefit from the
acquisition of further information about the candidate. As I shall discuss in
further detail below, for some judges this may be true. 193 For other judges,
however, especially taking into account the costs of competition at later times,
the marginal value of another semester's or another year's law school gmdes for
the evaluation of the candidate may well be less than the costs incurred by
delaying the offer. Just as we imagine the existence of decisive shoppers in
other markets, there is a return from becoming a decisive shopper in the market
for judicial clerks.
Judge Kozinski argued that there existed a natural time at which there was
sufficient information about an applicant to extend an offer: "around February or
h d l~Marc ofa stu ent's second year oflaw schooL" The authors of the Harvard-
Chicago Study, similarly, believed that they had proved that the clerkship
market was inefficient because the timing of the market differed as between
1998-99 and 1999_2000. 195 Again, imagining a single ideal time or a time that
192 The purchase of real estate or the submission of articles to law reviews or academic
journals are other examples.
193 Professor Roth explains the lack of unraveling in the market for assistant professors in
similar terms: "unraveling may be impeded if the uncertainty associated with hiring early is relatively
large compared to the possible benefits." Roth & Xing, supra note II, at 1036-37.
194 Kozinski, supra note 6, at 1710.
195 As the authors of the Harvard-Chicago Study put it:
For skeptics who tend toward the view that the current market. " must be operating
efficiently, the data presented here raise serious questions. If 1999-2000 was efficient, then
was 1998-1999, when hiring occurred substantially later, also efficient, or was it inefficient?
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would remain constant across years is innocent of the economic dimensions of
the market. There is a positive return to a judge from enhancing his or her
ability to predict the quality of clerks from restricted information. Lower levels
of information about an applicant, of course, imply greater uncertainty attending
the selection. But judges can be expected to invest in techniques of prediction
in order to gain the return from securing a more able clerk with the currency of
an early offer. The moment at which an offer will be extended will depend in
any case upon the judge's confidence in his or her predictive ability relative to
expectations of the quality of clerk that will be available after further search.
The gains from investments to secure and process information about future
. 111m' h 196prospects IS a we - own economic p enomenon.
This understanding of the distinctive character of the market for judicial
clerks allows a more careful definition to be given to the concept of market
unraveling. The Roth tradition employs the term "unraveling" to describe any
form of market-related activity that occurs prior to the defined beginning date of
a market. Thus, examples of unraveling include early clerkship or college bowl
offers, the NBA or NFL draft, summer jobs with law firms in America or for
articling students in Canada, "audition electives" in various surgery
specialties, sales of products outside the market-forestalling-in the Middle
Ages. This broad definition of unraveling is not generally useful.. By this
paper's analysis, however, it is possible to distinguish activities that represent
forms of market search-investments by parties in the market to gain further
information prior to engaging in market transactions-from market transactions
themselves in which time of the transaction serves as a currency to clear the
market. Thus, this analysis would distinguish summer jobs in law firms or
audition electives required ofprospective surgeons from the acceleration of offers
to clerks or medical residents because of restrictions on the use of alternative
terms of trade to clear the market.
This is a substantially different approach from that of the Roth tradition
and implies a substantially different normative evaluation of the various
examples of market urIraveling. By this analysis, those forms of unraveling that
consist of investments to obtain further market information become entirely
unproblematic. Summer jobs in law firms or audition electives for aspiring
surgeons are mechanisms through which participants in the market gain greater
More generally, given how much the timing in this market has bounced around over the
years, it seems hard to assert that any current resting point is efficient.
Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7. at 833.
196 See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, In/ormation. and the Law a/Contracts, 7
J. LEGAL STIJD. 1, 13-14 (1978).
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information-the employer about the candidate; the candidate about the job. 197
They are comparable to any other form of market search prior to purchase.
The analysis is somewhat diffurent of those examples in which unraveling
represents the use of time as a currency for transaction. The interesting question
becomes: why has the timing of the transaction become a currency? As we
shall see in a review of the various markets studied by Professor Roth,198 time
becomes a currency in contexts in which there generally appear to be external
restrictions on the use of price to clear the market. Where the use of price as a
market-clearing mechanism is constrained in some way-as it is in the market
for clerks since Congress sets a fixed salary-transaction timing emerges as a
currency in order to clear the market. Thus, far from an instance of market
failure, time becomes the medium through which market forces express
themselves.
Professor Roth's analysis of market unraveling concluded that it led to
inefficient market outcomes because of ex post mismatches among parties in the
market. As we shall see, there are several ways in which this analysis is
incomplete. First, each of the models in this tradition defines efficiency by
comparing ordinal matches-first-choice with first-choice; second with second;
and the like. It is this definition, of course, that provides support for the
adoption of centralized matching mechanisms, like the medical resident match,
which operate on the basis of ordinal rankings. Ordinal rankings and ordinal
matches, however, necessarily ignore all but uniform diffurences in intensity of
preference of market choices. Free-flowing markets recognize different
magnitudes of diffurences in intensity of preference through their various
adjustable terms of trade such as price. In markets in which many of these
terms are restricted, the timing of the transaction becomes the currency to
register intensity of preference. Where differences in intensity of preference are
acknowledged, it is no longer possible to conclude that unraveling of any form
generates global market inefficiencies.
Second, none of Professor Roth's models, nor any of those in the Roth
tradition, include the costs and benefits of information acquisition as elements.
As a consequence, the conclusion of inefficiency follows by definition from
differences in matching as between periods with lesser versus greater
information. That is, according to the Roth model, there exists a set of
candidates at time T - 1 attended by great uncertainty about individual
productivity; at time T, the same set of candidates are present, but with less
uncertainty about productivity. Given these assumptions, it is straightforward
197 The Harvard-Chicago Study adverts to the infonnation gain to law finns and students
from summer associates, Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at 858, but continues to describe it as a
fonn of unraveling.
198 See infra Section II.D.
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that there will be efficiency losses from matches entered at time T - 1 versus at
time T.
The Roth model resembles the analysis of commons problems in the
property rights literature. There has been substantial study and identification of
socially inefficient expenditures on search where property rights to a resource
can be captured by first possession. 199 Thus, in many resource contexts-a gold
rush, for example, or fish for which the state has defined a limited season-
individuals will invest socially excessive amounts iIi search because of the
distributional gain that attends being the first to capture the resource.200
In each of the resource contexts, however, as in Roth's model, the
conclusion that search investments are inefficient derives from the assumption
that the value of the resource to be captured remains constant over time. Thus,
halibut are halibut, gold is gold; in these models, the resource has a fixed value
to society regardless of when that value is realized. As a result, expenditures to
capture the resource earlier than rivals are socially wasteful since they achieve
only a distributive and not a productive gain.
In employment contexts, such as the market for judicial clerks or medical
residents, in contrast, the value of the resource to the judge changes over time.
Clerks are not fish, and it makes a difference to a judge to capture a more able
and congenial clerk. A more discriminate model would introduce the costs and
benefits both of the search process and those costs associated with the effuct of
the passage of time on the expected value of those applicants remaining in the
market. Thus, at a particular time, a judge estimates an expected value of an
applicant, knowing that that estimate is attended by error, which is to say,
uncertainty over the clerk's productivity. The judge can invest in obtaining
further information about the applicant to reduce that uncertainty. But those
investments will be attended by costs in two forms: the cost of the
investigation itself plus the cost that derives from the declining value of
available clerks as time progresses and other judges select the more able among
the clerkship pool. Of course, clerks are not fish in a second way. The market
is complicated by the fuet that the applicants are engaging in exactly the same
consideration: determining whether to invest in an interview with a more
199 Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348 (1968);
David D. Haddock, First Possession Versus Optimal Timing: Limiting the Dissipation of Economic
Value, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 775 (1986). I am grateful to David Haddock and Fred McChesney for
alerting me to this literature.
200 For an excellent description of many resource contexts of this nature, see Louis De
Alessi, Gains from Private Property: The Empirical Evidence, in PROPERTY RlGHTS: COOPERATION,
CONFLICT AND LAW 90 (Anderson & McChesney eds., 2003). As an example of the problem, De
Alessi shows that to prevent overlishing, Alaska was compelled to progressively reduce the open
season for halibut from nine months to two days as fishers invested in faster and more efficient boats
and equipment. ld. at 100-01.
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favored judge, knowing that the pool of available judges is declining over
. 201tIme.
Finally, it might be thought that Professor Roth's conclusion that there
are "potentially large losses in efficiency,,202 from transactions that occur prior
to the optimal momene03 can be supported by considering unraveling in the
market for clerks or other entry level employees as a coordination problem
resembling, say, the prisoners' dilemma. Isn't it proof of inefficiency that
matches entered at time T would be different than matches at time T - 1, where
there is greater aggregate information available at time T? Wouldn't
coordination that shifted the matches to time T, as coordination in the
prisoners' dilemma, eliminate that inefficiency?
The market for clerkships is not a prisoners' dilemma. In the prisoners'
dilemma, payoff assumptions are introduced that provide that the two prisoners
will be mutually better off if they coordinate their actions than if either
maximizes its respective interests individually. Of course, besides the context
of the prisoners, there are many other examples in which the payoff conditions
are such that all parties will be better off if they coordinate, rather than if each
maximizes individual interests.
Those payoff conditions, however, do not hold for the market for judicial
clerks or, as shall be shown later, for the other assortative matching markets
studied by Professor Roth. In the prisoners' dilemma, each of the two persons
arrested faces the risk that, if the other person maximizes his or her individual
interest by confessing, the one who refuses to confess will be worse off.
Coordination between them-the agreement of both to refuse to cOnfess-
eliminates that risk to the benefit of both. 204 The market for clerks is
substantially different. The judge who extends an early clerkship offer is
maximizing individual interest, as is the applicant who accepts the offer. It is
possible that, as in the prisoners' dilemma, judges who fail to enter the early
offer process are worse offas a consequence. But coordination among the judges
and applicants does not benefit all. If the judge and the applicant who fear being
less-favored are accurate in their estimations, coordination to postpone the
market harms them; the clerks or the clerkships that they obtain from the
delayed process will be less-favored than those that can be secured through
participation in the early-offer market.205
201 There are two principal differences between the clerkship market and Judge
Goodwin's calf scramble, see supra note 68. It makes a difference to a judge which clerk is selected;
in the calf scramble, one grabs the closest calf. Second, the calves resist; the clerks are searching.
202 Roth & Xing, supra note 11, at 992.
203 See supra text accompanying note 129.
204 Of course, the coordination of the prisoners does not benefit the state and, thus,
resembles cartelization of a market by which sellers benefit from coordination, though society loses.
205 The authors of the Harvard-Chicago Study acknowledged that some judges or
applicants might be better off by engaging in the early-offer process, but minimized the significance
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Indeed, it is the benefit from discovering an able clerk that creates
incentives for judges to invest in techniques of prediction. In this respect, the
market for judicial clerks is no different from many other markets in which
specialized knowledge allows a buyer to acquire a valuable object in advance of
the revelation of its value to the wider set of market participants. 206 Markets for
mineral rights, for art, for antiques, and for stocks, are all markets in which
buyers-like judges-make predictions offuture value, attended by uncertainty,
and gain a return according to the accuracy of their predictions. A judge who
discovers a worthy clerk and extends an early offer is no different from a buyer
who discovers an undervalued antique or a prospector who buys land rich with
undisclosed minerals. Those buyers later in the market denied the antique or
the land or the clerk may claim that a "cost" has been imposed upon them, but
it is not a cost that in a competitive economy commands normative
. ifi 207SIgn Icance.
Another way of observing this point is to describe the early-ofrer process
as creating a form of wealth effect. As explained earlier, although appellate
clerkships are fungible over a large range, the principal ditrerence among them
is in the dimension called "prestige:" some clerkships, because of the relative
prominence of the judge, are more attractive to applicants than others.208 As a
consequence, other things equal, prominent judges are able to secure the most
qualified clerkS. The early-ofter process, however, changes the distribution of
judicial wealth by adding an additional currency to the market, allowing a
relatively less prominent judge-if he or she is willing to invest in making an
early prediction-to compete for those relatively more qualified clerks desirous
of reducing risk by accepting an early ofrer. This is only a more general
description of Judge Kozinski's point describing himself as an upstart who
of the point on the grounds that the "Pareto [efficiency] standard is notoriously limited in its
usefulness, for rarely can one make some people better off without making even a single person
worse off." Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at 800. They turned the remainder of their analysis
to ''two other, more useful conceptions of efficiency": I) "[m]aximizing the 'sum total of satisfaction'
of judges and clerks" in which they concluded that the early offer process is certain to create
mismatches and that "insurance" against the risk of a worse match was not clearly desirable, id. at
800-04; and, 2) "[m]aximizing the production of justice" in which they were unable to resolve
whether matching the most able clerks with the most able judges or the reverse, maximized judicial
output. Id. at 804; see supra note 73.
206 See generally Kronman, supra note 196.
207 This point is similar to the concept of antitrust injury under the antitrust laws in which
harms imposed by the process of competition are held not to justify an antitrust claim. See, e.g.,
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
208 There are many other markets in which some measure of "prestige" of the object of
trade affects ultimate terms. In labor markets, the prestige of the position may lead highly qualified
individuals to accept a job despite large salary reductions-say, appointment to a position in the White
House Counsel's office or appointment to a federal bench (though I do not mean to diminish the public
service eharacter of such an appointment). Unlike appointment to a federal bench, appointment to the
White House Counsel's office or to a clerkship may well maximize lifetime income.
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needed to extend early offers in order to secme the most able clerks.209 The
wealth effect provided by allowing time-of-offer to serve as a currency enables
judges to compete, though their clerkships may lack the attraction of a D.C.
Circuit clerkship or of a clerkship with a well-known or prominent judge.
Bankrolled by the currency of an early offer, a less prominent judge can register
intensity of preference for a relatively attractive candidate and, perhaps, secme a
clerk who would not be available if the competition were constrained to the
prestige dimension. Of course, the time-of-offer currency is available to all of
the judiciary, and there is no reason to believe that it will only be spent by
judges with less attractive clerkships. Even prominent judges can register
intensity of preference with the time-of-offer currency. But they need to wade
into the early-offer process in order to do so.
The next Section applies this analysis to the findings of the Harvard-
Chicago Study. Later, Section D reviews the broad range of other markets
studied by Professor Roth.
B.' The Harvard-Chicago Critique ofthe Judicial Clerk Market Reanalyzed
This Section reexamines the fmdings of the Harvard-Chicago Study in
light of the analysis presented above of the operation of the clerkship market in
the context of market search. According to this view, the market for clerks-
like other entry-level labor markets-is attended by substantial uncertainty by
both judges and students as to mutual productivity and compatibility as well
as to whether, at later times, the pool of available clerks and the pool of
available clerkships will be the same. In a market of this nature, we should
expect both sides to potential transactions to invest substantially in search
prior to actual interaction in order to best take advantage of the time currency.
Thus, students will invest to learn about the characteristics of different
clerkships, and judges will invest to learn about students so that, when the
market unfolds, both parties can take best advantage of the early-offer currency.
Using that currency most effectively requires coordination-students identifYing
judges most likely to extend them an offer; judges fmding students that are
both most productive and most likely to accept their offers. Pre-market sorting
of this natme can be expected in the application process by the student, the
response to applications by the judge, in their mutual scheduling of interviews,
and in their responses following the interviews to obtain the most successful
matches. Once the market commences, again because time is a principal
currency, it will operate something like an auction where the first bidder
potentially becomes the highest bidder.
209 Kozinski, supra note 6, at 1719. He has since become, if he was not then, a major
Supreme Court "feeder." -
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Where the parties have sorted themselves appropriately based upon their
pre-market research-though also because of the pressures of time-judges are
likely to extend offers early in the process. Because the college and law school
records of many applicants will be roughly similar, judges may well be
relatively indifferent as among members of the set of applicants interviewed,
and so may insist on rapid responses to an ofter in order, if the ofter is rejected,
not to lose the opportunity to hire other qualified applicants. Again, it is in the
interest of applicants to coordinate interviews with favored judges as early in
the process as possible. Where successful, applicants may accept offers early in
the interview process.
A market of this nature, of course, is far from the ideal of most of the
judges who have criticized the clerkship market as well as of the authors of the
Harvard-Chicago Study. Their ideal market, in contrast, is one in which
judges collect wide amounts of information about the range of student
candidates and students about the range of clerkships, after which both decide
among the set of possible matchings which is the most attmctive to them.
Thus, the Harvard-Chicago Study states "[a] foundation for an efficient market
is the ability of market participants to consider and compare the alternatives
available in the marketplace.',210 The clerkship market is inefficient because
"[i]n a market with limited numbers of buyers and sellers, parties are not able
to gather information about multiple options and then act on that information
to seek out their most preferred alternatives.',211 The current market
disadvantages students because it "does not appear to be one in which students
have the opportunity to consider a range of options before making their
decisions.,,212 And it disadvantages judges because they must make hiring
decisions on the basis of insufficient information.213 Thus, each of the features of
the market that the Study describes-interviews leading quickly to offers; offers
requiring quick responses; offers being generally accepted; and many interviews
being canceled-are phenomena that the Study claims. demonstrate inefficiency.
As mentioned, it also fmds many sources of potential unfairness in the market,
with judges seeking recommendations from current clerks, former clerks, fuculty
brokers, and other friends. 214
The concept of an "ideal" market, however, is alien to positive
economics. The rapidity of the clerkship market is a function of the
unavailability of the use of more traditional terms of trade-most obviously,
price-that would serve to register a judge's intensity ofpreference to reflect the
expected productivity of the clerk to the judge and to otherwise serve to clear
210 Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at 799.
211 Id. at 801.
212 Id. at 820.
213 Id. at 801-02.
214 Id. at 844-45.
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the market. Because of the existence of the time-of-ofIer currency, judges and
students are not able to engage in the leisurely survey of all alternatives to
which the Harvard-Chicago Study aspires. 215 In the clerkship market, the
parties must front-load their market search prior to commencement of the
interview-offer period of the market. As in any market, the buycrs-judges-
can be expected to make ofIers only when they have concluded that they
possess sufficient information subject to the costs offurther search, and students
will only accept offers on the same grounds. The informational basis for such
decisions will surely be diffurentthan in the more protracted process idealized
in the Harvard-Chicago Study, but it cannot in any coherent economic sense
be said to be inadequate; otherwise, offers would neither be extended nor
accepted.
The Harvard-Chicago Study'S findings concerning the character of the
clerkship market-interviews lead quickly to offers; offers require quick
responses; offers are generally accepted; subsequent interviews are canceled-
correspond exactly to the market search analysis. The principal difference is that
the Harvard-Chicago Study finds each of the features of the clerkship market to
be tailings, rather than the expected working out of market processes given the
unavailability of alternative terms of trade. A reevaluation of the Study's
findings, therefore, presents a different normative cast to the operation of the
clerkship market.
First, the Harvard-Chicago Study interprets its various fmdings
illustrating the rapidity of the market as demonstrating chaos or, at the
minimum, the lack of careful deliberation by both judges and applicants over a
wide range of potential matching opportunities. This characterization is only
available, however, if it is assumed that judges and applicants engage in little
pre-market investment in search and are ultimately matched in interviews
haphazardly without general attention to ultimate prererences. The Study's
findings can be interpreted, conversely, to show the general success of pre-
market search and sorting. For example, the Study found that, in 34% of
interviews, judges extend offers immediately following the interview; in a
cumulative 57%, within two days; in a cumulative 67%, within four days.216
Unless large numbers of judges are behaving irrationally, these figures suggest
the success of pre-sorting selections at a relatively high level.
Similarly, the Study found that the first ofIer was received after the
student's first interview 36% of the time; after the second interview, a
cumulative 59%; and after the third interview, a cumulative 78% of the time. 217
215 Of course, this "ideal" is unrealistic in a deeper sense: in all markets, the extent of the
survey of alternatives will be determined by the relationship between the costs and benefits of furthcr
search.
216 Id. at 814 tbl.1.
217 !d. at 814 tbl.2.
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Again, these findings suggest that students and judges are generally highly
successful in identifying compatible matches prior to commencement of the
interview process.
The Harvard-Chicago Study is highly critical that the oifur-acceptance
process in the clerkship market occurs prior to the completion of the full set of
interviews scheduled by judges and applicants, respectively, on the grounds
that neither judges nor applicants appear to be considering the full set of
potential matches. Thus, the Study reports, disparagingly, that 64% of judges
began making offers prior to the completion of their scheduled interviews with
students. 218 It is further evidence of market inefficiency that 79% of judges in
1999 and 66% in 2000 had subsequently-scheduled interviews canceled by
students.219 But in the context ofa market where continued search is costly, an
offer extended prior to an interview or a canceled interview does not indicate
inefficiency. Again, where the ideal is the canvassing of all relevant alternatives
prior to a judge's selection of a clerk or a clerk-<:andidate's of a judge, an early
offer or a canceled interview may suggest some level of restricted alternatives.
Thus, the Study states that this high frequency of student cancellations shows
that "applicants are missing the chance to consider what might be more
preferred alternatives.,,22o But few shoppers canvass every alternative product. A
judge's extension of an offer before completing all scheduled interviews or a
student applicant canceling subsequent interviews because of acceptance of an
earlier oifur is not inefficient, any more than it is inefficient for a consumer to
buy a product before reaching the third-ehoice store on his or her list. To the
contrary, it is suggestive of the returns from investment in pre-market search to
identify those applicants and those judges with whom the other is most likely
to successfully match. Further interviews may be scheduled because of the risk
that early-scheduled interviews may not be successful. But where early-
interviews are successful, it shows not that the process is failing, but that it
works.
Finally, the Study's suggestion that it might well be unfuir for judges to
make use of information sources extraneous to the application-interview process
is illustrative of the Study's insensitivity to the benefits of information to the
clerkship market and the costs of acquiring it. The Study suggests, for example,
that it might be rcgarded as unfair for judges to acquire information about
candidates from other students, from current clerks who knew the candidates in
law school, from former clerks, from fuculty brokers, or from other of the
judge's acquaintances. 221 With respect to the last of these sources, there is no
defense of cronyism. Where a candidate receives a clerkship offer not on the
218 [d. at815-17&tbI.3.
219 [d. at 827 tbl.1l.
220 [d. at 826.
221 [d. at 840-45.
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merits, but because the candidate is related in some way to an acquaintance of
the judge, surely all will condemn the appointment. But it is a peculiar
conclusion for a Study aspiring to enhance the opemtion of a market viewed as
being insufficiently informed to criticize judges for employing available
information sources that might enhance their ability to select attmctive clerks.
Classmates, former classmates, and trusted fuculty, all can provide substantial
information about an applicant that may not be readily apparent from the
written record alone.
The authors of the Harvard-Chicago Study generously have made
available the mw data from the 2000 Judge and Student Surveys. Though not
reported in the Study's published results, there are various data from the
Surveys that suggest that the Study's emphasis on the chaotic and
undisciplined character of the clerkship market may be an overstatement. As
one example, Table 1, below, presents findings on the number of interviews
conducted by judges during the clerkship selection process at the time the
judge extended the first clerkship ofter. The Harvard-Chicago Study did not
report the number of interviews per judge, focusing instead on the mpidity of
the extension of offers following interviews.222
Table 1: Number of Interviews at First Offer by Early-Offering
Judges
Number ofInterviews
1-3
4-6
7-9
10-12
More than 12
Number of Judges
5
8
14
5
15
Percent of Judges
Responding
10.6
17.0
29.8
10.6
31.9
Source: Derived by author from Harvard-Chicago 2000 Judge Survey (on file with author).
Table I shows the number of interviews per judge for that group of judges
most likely to be instigating the early-ofter phenomenon. In another question,
the Survey asked when judges began conducting interviews and making
clerkship offers, providing as available answers months between September
1999 (the absolute beginning of a student's second year) to periods following
February 2000 (after the reporting ofa student's third semester grades). Table 1
segregates off those judges who began conducting interviews during or before
December 1999, relatively early in the clerkship market, before the receipt of
students' third semester grades. These early-offur judges might be those
222 Id. at813-17.
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expected to have made decisions based on the least extensive infonnation,
illustrative of the irrationality that is purported to be a consequence of the early
competition.
The interview figures show a market in which there is :fur more investment
by judges to collect infonnation through comparative interviews than might be
imagined from the Harvard-Chicago Study's characterization of the market.
Over 42% of early-offering judges conducted, ten or more interviews prior to
extending their first offer. Over 72% conducted seven or more. Almost 90% of
early-offering judges conducted four or more interviews prior to extending a
clerkship offer. Even early-offering judges make substantial investments to
evaluate candidates.
Table 2: Shortest Time Given Candidate to Respond to
Affirmative Offer
Time
Immediately
Less than day
I day
2 days
3 days
4 days
5 days
Several days
I week
10 days
2 weeks
3 weeks
1 month
No Limit
Number of Judges
6
3
11
11
7
4
2
1
10
1
3
1
1
16
Percent of Judges
7.8
3.9
14.3
14.3
9.1
5.2
2.6
1.3
13.0
1.3
3.9
1.3
1.3
20.8
Source: Derived by author from the Harvard-Chicago 2000 Judge Survey (on file with author).
The Harvard-Chicago Study makes much of the exploding ofter
phenomenon, both as exemplary of the effi:cts of corrosive competition and as
an example of ethical breaches by the judiciary.223 Thus, the Study describes a
market that gives students "little apparent time to consider multiple options,"
emphasizing that 25% ofJudges required clerks to respond to affirmative otrers
within twenty-four hours. 24 The figure is accurate, though the characterization
223 Jd. at 817-20.
224 fd, at 817.
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is somewhat of an exaggeration. I will discuss the ethics of exploding offers in
a context of a market in which time serves as a currency below. Remember,
however, that the 1990 Judicial Conference refonn of the clerkship market
sought agreement to keep oJrers open for twenty-four hours. Table 2 presents
the full data from the survey to infonn the discussion.
Table 2 shows that the exploding offer problem is much less serious than
might be imagined. According to the Survey, only 7.8% of judges required
students to respond immediately-the truly exploding offer; only 11.7%, in
less than 24 hours. Indeed, to the contrary, the Survey suggests that judges
generally gave students prolonged time frames to consider offers, suggestive
that the level of judicial risk aversion because of competition in the markct is
less extensive than might be thought. Almost 21 % of judges imposed no time
limit on acceptance. Over 41% gave students a week or longer to respond. 225
A more interesting question is whether an exploding o:ffi:r ought to be
regarded as an ethical violation in some way. Many markets impose time
limitations on the acceptance of offers. E-Bay allows the seller to detennine the
time limit. Live auctions involve truly exploding offers; the buyer is given
seconds to accept or reject at the then-asking price. Markets with time limits
for acceptance compel potential buyers to make their search investments iIi
advance and to be prepared with reservation prices at the time the offer is made.
Is the judicial clerkship market different in some respect? Imagine a judge who
has interviewed a number of students and who finds only small differences in
preference as among them. In a context of competition over the timing of offers
with other judges, an exploding o:ffi:r is a rational mechanism for maximizing
the chances of a match with one of the preferred set. It is difficult to regard it as
unethical. An exploding ofrer may impose substantial and uncomfortable
pressure on a student who did not understand the nature of the market or who,
because of coordination difficulties, could not arrange earlier interviews with
preferred judges. But is it unfuir in some other way?
Perhaps the most controversial finding of the Harvard-Chicago Study as
against the market search interpretation relates to students' acceptances of offers
in relation to their overall preferences. The Study asked students whether the
first offer they received was from their first-choice judge and also whether they
accepted that offer.226 As mentioned, the Study found that 34% of students
received their first offer from their first-choice judge.227 All of those students
225 There may be underreponing here by the judges. The Harvard-Chicago Student Survey
did not ask how much time students were given to respond to an offer-because, according to a
communication with Professor Jol1s, of a legitimate concern that the number of students responding
was so much less than the universe that the answers would be misrepresentative. Thus, it is impossible
to cross-check the judges' answers.
226 !d. at 823 tbl.9.
227 Id.
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accepted the offer.228 The authors do not address the point, but 34% of the
surely several hundreds of applicants229 is a high number of first-choice
matches. There are only twelve judges on the D.C. Circuit and a handful of
other obviously prestigious judges. The statistic showing 34% of applicants
achieving immediate success shows substantial effective sorting. 230
More debatable, however, is the interpretation of the converse statistic:
66% of students received first ofli:rs from judges other than their first-choice
judge. Of this group, 42o/o-eomprising 28% of the total student pool-
declined the offer, moving on to other judges. But 58% of that group-equal to
38% of the total student sample-accepted that first offer even though not from
their first-choice judge, suggesting matching problems. Without further detail,
however, it is difficult to evaluate this statistic. First, that 42% declined their
first offer does not suggest market failure. All shoppers decline offers
continuously prior to engaging in transactions. 231 Understanding the decisions
of the 58% who accepted non-fIrst choice offers is more complicated. These
decisions may derive from difficulties in coordination. Students submit
applications; judges invite some of their applicants for interviews; both try to
schedule interviews to maximize mutual matching; but that maximization is
difficult. The fIgure might also reflect to some extent the bird-in-the-hand risk
aversion of students that will attend any market with inherent uncertainty about
ultimate outcomes. Risk aversion is a real cost. Those students accepting ofli:rs
from less than first-choice judges must have believed that they were better off
doing so, rather than waiting for an offer from their single most-preferred judge.
The statistic, however, might also simply reflect that the first-choices of
students and judges did not coincide, surely to be expected in any assortative
matching market. It would be interesting to know, for example, how many of
the group that accepted non-first-choice offers had succeeded in scheduling
interviews with their first-choice judge. That is, the implication of a student
accepting an offer from less than a first-choice judge is different if the student
had some prospect of interviewing with the fust-choice than if the fIrst-choice
judge had already rejected or had failed to contact the student at the time of the
alternative offer. The Harvard-Chicago Study did not ask that question.
There is some further information, however, available on that point.
Although not reported in the Harvard-Chicago Study itself, the fuller data
show that, of the set of students who accepted offers from other than their first-
choice judge, 44% had concluded three or more interviews at the time they
228 Id.
229 There are no data on the number of applicants or applications.
230 I am grateful to Scott Masten for this emphasis.
23 I The data show some interesting features of the group who rejected their first clerkship
offer. Of the group, 71 % had received another clerkship offer before rejecting the first offer; 56%
received a second offer within two days of the offer they rejected. Derived by author.
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Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at 814 tbl.2.
It reported only judicial rankings of the importance of law review membership. !d. at
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accepted the offer; 72% had concluded two or more.232 Elsewhere, the Harvard-
Chicago Study found that 36% of applicants received offers after their first
interview; a cumulative 59%, after their second; and a cumulative 78%, after
their third.233 Given those statistics, it is not implausible that the large
majority of applicants accepting offers from non-first choice judges saw their
prospects of better offers declining and accepted the less-favored offer on that
ground.
The Harvard-Chicago Survey did ask the judges what information they
found most important to making clerkship decisions. The published Study did
not make much use of the answers,234 and the question was not framed in a way
to fully elucidate the judicial market search process.235 The potential responses
available in the Survey all related to the candidate's law school performance.
Nevertheless, space was provided for a response "Other," in which the surveyed
judges could indicate other sources of information useful to the clerkship
selection process. 236 Here, some interesting results. appear. Table 3 is a
summary of the most frequent other--non-Iaw school--sources of
information upon which judges made clerkship selections.
Table 3: Source of Extraneous Information Used by Judges
Information Source Number of Judges
Student's life experiences 22
Personal traits 9
Public service commitment 9
Undergraduate professors 7
Source: Derived by author from the Harvard-Chicago 2000 Judge Survey (on file with author).
One judge provided a more detailed answer: "Tied among top 5 are (a)
LSAT scores, (b) life experiences and interests, and (c) college and (if
232
233
234
887 tbl. A2.
235 The Survey question provided a very limited set of possible responses (plus an "Other";
see text accompanying note 236): law school grades; recommendations from familiar professors, from
other professors, from past employers, and from peers; law review membership; law review board
position; and writing sample. Id at 808-09. Note that the responses did not include the candidate
interview itself, as the authors felt this would have been important to all judges, id. at 809, (of course
the interesting question is, how important?), nor any information regarding candidate performance
prior to the candidate's law school career. Moreover, the Survey only asked for ordinal rankings of
these information sources, id. at 808-09, not inquiring about the relative significance of the various
information sources (though this approach is surely in keeping with the authors' commitment to ordinal
rankings).
236 See id at 887 tbl. A2 n.b.
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applicable) graduate school grades, and somewhat important are the neatness
and coherence of the cover letter.',237
These responses support the point that there are various sources of
information besides a student's law school performance upon which to base the
offer of a clerkship. In markets in which the time-of-offer currency presses
decisions to earlier points, the information base upon which judges make
decisions must shift. The student's performance prior to law school becomes of
greater relevance than when the clerkship decision can be made at a later period.
Thus, the widespread criticism that, in the current clerkship market, the
information available is insufficient or inadequate238 neglects the informational
dynamic of the process. Where, because of the timing of the process, law
school information is limited, a judge will resort to other information sources
to aid in the evaluation of a student's abilities.
Table 4: Circuit and Years-on-Bench of Early-Offering Judges
Circuit
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Number of Early-
Offering Judges
3
6
5
1
3
4
2
Circuit
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth
Eleventh
D.C.
Federal
Number of Early-
Offi:ring Judges
8
7
2
2
5
2
Years on Bench
< 6 years
6-10
11-15
16-20
21-25
26-30
31-35
Number of Early-
Offi:ring Judges
14
13
11
4
3
1
3
Percent of Early-
Offi:ring Judges
28.6
26.5
22.4
8.2
6.1
2.0
6.1
Source: Derived by author from the Harvard-Chicago 2000 Judge Survey (on file with author).
237 Harvard-Chicago 2000 Judge Survey (on file with author).
238 Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at 801 ("Decisions must be reached on the basis
of extremely limited information."). See generally Oberdorfer & Levy, supra note 6.
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Finally, who are the early offering judges? The Harvard-Chicago Study
characterizes them as judges caught in a mt mce that they cannot avoid except
through a collective agreement to suppress early interviews and early hiring.
Thc Harvard-Chicago Judge Survey collected only geneml information about
the judges, justifiably in order to preserve anonymity. Table 4, above,
however, shows the appellate circuit upon which early-otrering judges sit and
their approximate years on the bench. Again, the judges indicated in Table 4
are those interviewing and extending offers prior to the receipt of students'
third-semester gmdes.
Again, for the protection of identification, these data are quite geneml. But
they are interesting. They show, first, that early-ofrering judges are spread fairly
evenly among the appellate circuits. They also show that those judges who
participate in the early-offer process are the relatively newer judges on the
courts, though not entirely newly appointed judges. Of the early-ofrering set,
nearly 30% had been sitting for less than six years at the time of the survey;
over 55% for no more than ten years. Yet even judges with substantial
experience engaged in the early-offer process. Of the early-offering group, over
22% had been on the bench for over sixteen years, perhaps building on their
experience in selecting clerks in the past.
The different approaches of the Harvard-Chicago Study and this paper's
fucus on market search and the value of information conflict sharply with
respect to proposals for market reform. As discussed earlier, the authors of the
Harvard-Chicago Study believe that the only feasible refurm for the clerkship
market is adoption of a centmlized matching mechanism, resembling the
medical resident match, designed by Professor Roth. 239 According to such a
mechanism, following extensive interviews, judges and students would
separately submit ordinal mnkings which a computer would sort to maximize
ordinal preferences. The authors recognized, however, that many judges would
oppose such a mcchanism, and modified their proposal so that the clerkship
match would only be mandatory for clerks who wanted to be considered for a
subsequent Supreme Court clerkship and for judges who wanted their clerks
considered for those c1erkships. The authors focused the reform proposal on
candidacy for Supreme Court c1erkships not because of any concern about the
market for Supreme Court clerks; the Justices reported no problems in their
clerkship market. Instead, the justification for the proposal was a form of
realpolitik: the Supreme Court possesses the authority to mandate a match for
their clerks; all other courts lack that authority. The Supreme Court is
indifferent to the process of choosing its clerks since they have plenty of
qualified candidates. If indifrerent, why shouldn't the Court compel the match
to help those judges on the circuit courts who would prefer a match? Even with
239 See Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at 868-84.
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a Supreme Court clerk match of this nature, however, the authors expected that
there might be cheating. To deter it, they proposed some level of
randomization of preferences within the match.
It is not necessary in this paper to take any position on market refonn. It
is perhaps worthy of note, however, to indicate the extent to which the refonns
proposed by the Harvard-Chicago Study are inconsistent with the ambition of
improving welfure by increasing infonnation in the market. As mentioned,
centralized matching mechanisms are designed to maximize ordinal preferences.
By definition, ordinal rankings suppress differences in intensity of preference as
between the rankings. There are no widely accepted means of registering
strength of preference within any ranking.240 As a consequence-a well-accepted
proposition in the public choice literature-ordinal maximization does not
h '" f --"-- 241guarantee t e maXImIzatIon 0 aggregate prCLclcnces.
In contrast, markets maximize aggregate preferences by allowing intensity
of preference to be readily registered. The most common medium for registering
intensity of preference is price-the highest bidder is the person who most
wants the product or service-but other tenns of trade can serve the same
purpose. In the context of the clerkship market where, as has been discussed,
price signals are suppressed, time-of-offur serves as a market-clearing
mechanism to allow judges with higher intensities of preference for clerks to
bid them away from judges whose intensities of preference are lower. The
centralized matching mechanism, of course, extinguishes this medium.
Perhaps most surprising of the Harvard-Chicago refonn proposals is the
response to the prospect of cheating on the proposed clerkship match. The
cheating the authors fear consists of agreements or understandings between
judges and clerk-applicants entered prior to the match over the rankings that
each will submit. Thus, they are concerned that a judge will meet and get to
know a student-and the student, the judge-and mutually agree to submit the
other's name as their first choice, violating the confidentiality rule of the
matching mechanism. To prevent such behavior, they propose that, if detected
in sufficient volume, "a small degree of randomization" could be introduced
into the match "to destabilize the infonnal understandings.,,242
The nonnative characterization of understandings between judges and
clerk-applicants as "cheating" exposes the peculiar regulatory impulse that lies
beneath the proposal. Pre-match agreements between judges and students (or,
in the medical resident match, between students and hospitals) are a fonn of
240 As an example, one judge may prefer applicant one far more than applicant two and be
largely indifferent as between applicants three and four, with a slight preference for three. A second
judge may find applicants one and two largely indistinguishable, but prefer two far more than three;
and so forth. In a highly plausible context of this nature, maximizing ordinal matches cannot be
guaranteed to maximize aggregate welfare.
241 See, e.g., 3 DENNlS C. MUELLER, PuBLIC CHOICE 591 (2003).
242 Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at 882-84.
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cheating only in the sense of a violation of those rules of the match that seek to
eliminate all non-match agreements in order to maximize control over the
employment process by the match. But the authors strive to achieve this goal
by adopting a set of rules that would seem to frustrate the objectives of the
process itself. That is, the most basic goal here is to facilitate the matching ofa
judge and a student who want to work together. The authors' proposal,
however, regards the mutual agreement of a judge and a student to work
together as "cheating." Moreover, the notion that an effective means of
deterring such behavior is to randomize the match results turns the process
entirely on its head. Can it be defended that, to preserve the integrity of a
mechanism adopted to improve the matching of the preferences of judges and
clerks, the matches should be randomized?
Finally, in light of the recommendations of Judge Wald and Judge
Oberdorfer to explicitly adopt the medical matching mechanism243 and of the
recommendation of the Harvard-Chicago Study to adopt a modified medical
match, some further attention might be given to the consequences of efforts to
constrain the timing of the judicial clerkship market. First, I have earlier
referred to the "wealth effect" character of the availability of time-of-offur as a
currency in the market, giving certain judges willing to invest in techniques of
prediction power in the market that they might not otherwise possess. Efforts
to constrain timing, either by agreements such as on a March 1 or April 1
hiring date, by the current deferral of clerkship applications until after Labor
Day or, surely, by adoption of a centralized matching mechanism, obviously
reduce or eliminate that "wealth effect." Who benefits from postponed or
centralized matching? In the clerkship market idealized by the Harvard-
Chicago Study, among others, in which after an cxtensive series of interviews,
students and judges armed with comprehensive information about the full judge
and clerkship pool make choices among potential options, which judges are
most likely to benefit?
The benefit most commonly invoked of postponed decision-making in the
clerkship market is the avoidance of competition; thus, the many criticisms of
the alleged "frenzied" or "chaotic" character of the market, surely the tone of
the Harvard-Chicago Study. Undoubtedly, many judges abjure market
competition; perhaps that was one of the attractions to them of leaving practice
and becoming a judge. It seems evident, however, that the judges most likely
to benefit from delayed choice or centralized matching are the relatively more
attractive judges: those judges whose clerkships are most desired by the largest
number of clerkship candidates. Postponing the clerkship selection process
allows these judges to survey the entire pool of applicants and pick off the very
243 Wald. supra note 6, at 160-63; Oberdorfer & Levy, supra note 6.
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best of them for themselves. Postponing the market is also likely to mos~
benefit the most-qualified applicants.
Prominent judges are not disabled by an early-offur process; surely not, a
prestigious clerkship remains a prestigious clerkship. But to guarantee that
they secure the most able clerks, these judges have to compete with their less
prominent colleagues, compelling these prominent judges to make decisions
based upon less information about applicants than they would otherwise prefer.
To less prominent judges, entering the early-offer market for clerks resembles
prospecting: if energy is spent wisely, there may be great returns otherwise
unavailable. To relatively prominent judges, in contrast, the efforts of the less
prominent in instigating the early-offer process must surely be an annoyance.
When some judges begin interviews at early points or extend clerkship offurs,
other judges who also want the best clerks must compete as well. It is surely
more difficult to identify those applicants who will make the most productive
clerks early in the process rather than late. This is the burden imposed upon
the relatively prominent judge by the commencement of the competition of the
early-offer process. It is no wonder that many of the most able and prominent
judges in the country have endorsed increasing regulation of the timing of the
clerkship rnarket.244 Their advocacy, however, and their distaste of the early-
offer clerkship market may only be a variation of Hicks' fumous aphorism, that
the best of all monopoly returns is a quiet life.245
The second principal effect of constraints on market timing such as the
current application moratorium is to compress match-making into a
substantially shorter time period than would otherwise prevail. This
compression can be predicted to increase the premium on tactical interview
scheduling, thus reducing the number of interviews that applicants and judges
can effectively undertake. This compression will also increase the costs to
judges of affording applicants extensive time to consider accepting an offer.
Thus, the exploding offer phenomenon is likely to increase. 246 The
compression will provide more choices to more prominent judges; less, to the
less prominent. It cannot, in any general sense, be predicted to increase the
aggregate effectiveness ofjudge-clerk matchmaking.
244 This characterization may be unfair because the most able judges are usually likely to
be the most prominent promoters of any reform recommendation. I also do not mean to suggest any
self-serving behavior here. To my knowledge, this wealth effect analysis has not before been part of
the literature.
245 lR. Hicks, Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly, 3
ECONOMETRICA 1, 8 (1935).
246 The Harvard-Chicago Study, of course completed prior 10 the moratorium, predicted
similar effects. Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at 862-68.
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C. The Curious Case of Yale Law Schoof47
As perhaps a footnote to the discussion of the clerkship market, it is
interesting to address the role and experience of Yale Law School in the
clerkship reform movement and in the market itself. Yale is apparently unique
among law schools in having adopted a policy according to which all students'
first semester courses are ungraded. This policy means that Yale students
receive fewer law school grades--one semester fewer-than students at all other
law schools. The significance of the policy to the clerkship market is that, as
the clerkship market commences at earlier and earlier times in students' law
school careers, the relative law school grade deficiency of Yale students
increases. Where the market begins at the end of law students' third semester,
Yale students will have two semesters of law school grades on record; students
at all other schools, three semesters-one and a half times the Yale amount.
Where the market begins earlier, at the beginning of the students' second year,
Yale students will have one semester of law school grades; students at other
schools, two semesters-twice the Yale amount. 248
The Yale Law grade disadvantage is one of many reasons that two recent
Deans of Yale Law School, Guido Calabresi and Anthony T. Kronman, have
strenuously and eHectively advocated reforms that would serve to delay
commencement of the market. Dean Calabresi, as has been discussed earlier,
led an organization of law deans to support a March I (of the student's second
year) benchmark date; later, as a Judge on the Second Circuit, he joined Judge
Becker and Justice Breyer in their advocacy of the "March I Solution. ,,249 Dean
Calabresi's successor, Dean Kronman, was equally ardent in organizing the
academy to constrain commencement of the market.
The Harvard-Chicago Study does not address the impact of the market, of
unraveling in the market, or of market reforms on comparative law school
success, but it does report appellate clerkships by school for the 2000 clerkship
year. Table 5, below, reproduces the Study's results in Columns I through 3.
Column I presents the u.s. News & World Report ranking of law schools for
the year 2000, roughly in order ofranking. 2so Column 2 presents the number of
appellate clerks during the 2000 term from each school; Column 3, the
247 The conflicted loyalties here are overwhelming.
248 The deficiency is not quite so dramatic because Yale students will typically seek
recommendations from one-though typically, in my experience, not more than one--{)f their first
semester teachers, providing the equivalent of a grade.
249 See the discussion, supra text accompanying notes 58-64.
250 The Harvard-Chicago Study elevated the University of Chicago which, though ranked
sixth by u.s. News & World Report, appears as the fourth school on the list. It did so because its survey
sampled Chicago students given that one of its co-authors is affiliated with the University of Chicago.
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school's student class size;251 Column 4 (derived by the author), the percentage
of clerks within each law school's class. The year 2000 was one in which the
clerkship market was completely unregulated. The Judicial Conference
withdrew the March 1 benchmark in 1998. Subsequent reform efforts had
proven unavailing.
Table 5: Federal Appellate Clerkships by Law School Class
(1) (2) (3) (4)
U.S. News Number of Clerks as %
Ranking Clerks Size of Class of Class
Yale I 45 192 23.44
Stanford 2 16 182 8.79
Harvard 3 56 552 10.14
Chicago 6 26 188 13.83
NYU 4 21 443 4.74
Columbia 5 22 389 5.66
Michigan 7 13 356 3.65
Berkeley 8 13 282 4.61
Virginia 9 17 363 4.68
Cornell 10 7 182 3.85
Duke 10 10 214 4.67
Northwestern 12 10 217 4.61
Penn 13 4 252 1.59
Georgetown 14 20 587 3.41
Texas 15 4 470 0.85
UCLA 16 10 319 3.13
USC 17 1 203 0.49
Vanderbilt 18 4 187 2.14
Minnesota 19 2 235 0.85
Wash. & Lee 20 3 122 2.46
Source: Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at 888 at tbl. A3 (footnotes omitted). Numbers in
Column 4 derived by author (i.e., Col. 2/Col. 3).
251 The class sizes in Table 5 are approximations. Like U.S. News & World Report, the
Harvard-Chicago Study determined class size by dividing the total number of students at each school
by three. This calculation is probably a close approximation, but is an approximation.
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As Table 5 shows, Yale Law School was ranked number one in the
country in the year 2000.252 Table 5 also shows, however, that in the year
2000, Yale Law School placed a far higher percentage of its graduating students
in appellate clerkships than any other law school. Column 4 shows that
23.44% of the Yale graduating class secured appellate clerkships. In
comparison, Stanford, the second-ranked law school, placed 8.79%; Harvard,
third-ranked, placed 10.14%, less than half of Yale's; and Chicago, the sixth-
ranked, placed 13.83%, substantially greater than its fourth- and fifth-ranked
competitors, NYU and Columbia, but again less than two-thirds of Yale's
placement.
These results should seem surprising. Tn a time-the year 2000---
characterized by extreme clerkship market unraveling (again the Judicial
Conference abandoned all benchmark dates in 1998)-Yale students should be
expected to be at an increasing disadvantage because of the absence of first
semester grades.253 What can account for their extraordinary comparative
success in the clerkship market?
One explanation is that Yale Law School is just a much superior school
to aU others. But this explanation of differential clerkship success is
implausible.254 The u.s. News & World Report study, besides providing
ordinal rankings, provided what it called an "Overall Score" in which the first-
ranked school scored 100; the lesser-ranked, some fraction. 255 For the year
2000, Yale as the first-ranked scored by definition 100.256 Stanford, the second-
ranked, scored 92; Harvard, the third-ranked, scored 91; Chicago, the sixth-
ranked, scored 84.257 However skeptical we might be about the approximate
nature of U.S. News & World Report's' ranking methodology, these rankings
would not support the empirical tact that Yale Law School placed 2.67 times
the fraction of its graduating class in appellate clerkships as second-ranked
Stanford, 2.31 times the fraction as third-ranked Harvard, and 1.69 times that of
the (over-achieving or under_rated258) University of Chicago. Again, what
accounts for Yale Law School's comparative success?
252 The U.S. News & World Report law school rankings have been quite stable over the past
decade. See, e.g., Law Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp., Mar. 21, 1994, at 72; Schools ofLaw, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REp., Mar. 2,1998, at 78; Schools ofLaw, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 9, 2001,
at 78.
253 The Harvard-Chicago Study also predicted that Yale Law students would suffer a
disadvantage in the market because of the grade deficiency. Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at
861.
254
255
256
note 255.
257
258
See supra note 247.
Methodology, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 10,2000, at 74.
Schools ofLaw, us. NEWS & WORLD REp., Apr. 10, 2000, at 73; Methodology, supra
Schools ofLaw, supra note 256.
I am a devoted graduate of the University of Chicago Law School.
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A focus on market information and the determinants of market search
suggests an answer. As the nation's first-ranked law school, Yale is likely to
receive applications from many of the most productive applicants in the country
as measured by available indicia ofpetformance prior to law school. If it admits
the most productive of those applicants, its entering law school class will, at
least by the record, comprise the most able-again, record-wise--of any
entering class in any law school.
As unraveling in the market for judicial c1erkships presses the market to
earlier and earlier times, the relative importance of a candidate's pre-law school
record, as compared to the law school record, increases. This is a simple
economic point. As there is less information about law school petformance,
information about petformance prior to law school gains greater importance.
This means, however, that unraveling benefits Yale Law School students
because unraveling marginally shifts the information base that is significant for
the clerkship decision from law school performance-for which there is
uniformly less information-to pre-law school petformance where Yale students
possess an advantage.
Table 6: Proportion of Yale Law School Class Obtaining
Appellate Clerkships
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
(1)
Number of App.
Clerks
40
43
44
55
56
48
46
61
58
64
65
68
(2)
Size of Class
161
164
169
172
184
178
168
203
159
176
172
180
(3)
Percent of Class
24.84
26.22
26.04
31.98
30.43
26.97
27.38
30.05
36.48
36.36
37.79
37.78
Source: Derived by author from data from Yale Law School Career Development and
Registrar's Offices and the JUDtCIAL YELLOW BOOK, various years (on file with author).'"
259 Note that these numbers differ from the numbers in the Harvard-Chicago Study. 1 am
confident that my numbers are more accurate. The Harvard-Chicago Study took its clerkship numbers
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Some further research is suggestive on this topic, though more work
needs to be done. Table 6 above presents Yale's appellate clerkship experience
since 1990. Column 1 presents the number of appellate clerks in each
graduating class; Column 2, class size; Column 3, the percentage of the class
obtaining appellate clerkships.26o
Table 6 shows (in Column 3) that the percentage of each Yale Law
School graduating class obtaining appellate clerkships increased steadily from
1990 to 1993 (from 24.84 to 31.98%), dropping slightly in ]994 (to 30.43%).
In 1994, it will be remembered, the Judicial Conference joined by major law
schools led by Yale's Dean Guido Calabresi, introduced the March 1
benchmark date, constricting earlier commencement of the clerkship market.
The March 1, 1994 date would control clerkships for the 1996 year. Column 3
shows that Yale's class percentage dropped significantly in 1995 (to 26.97%)
for reasons not entirely clear, and in 1996 (at 27.38%) was still about 3% less
than in 1994 and nearly 5% less than in 1993. According to casual surveys of
the market, however, after 1994, the benchmark was increasingly ignored and,
of course, was abandoned entirely in 1998. Thus, the market became
increasingly unregulated; the clerkship market began at progressively earlier
times, seemingly to the disadvantage of Yale students. Over the same period,
however, Yale's percentage-of-class placed in appellate clerkships successively
rose to its highest point in 2001 (at 37.78%), over ten percentage points higher
than the 1996 figure.
I do not wish to make too much of these data. 261 They are suggestive,
however, of the basic analysis. In evaluating any market-including the market
fur judicial clerks-it is essential to concentrate upon marginal changes in the
determinants of market search. A constraint on the timing of market
transactions shifts the information base upon which market participants make
decisions so that information from later periods gains a marginal advantage
over information from earlier periods. In contrast, the elimination of that
constraint, in a context in which time-of-o:ffer becomes a currency, leads judges
only from the Judicial Yellow Book, which they admit to be incomplete, Harvard-Chicago Study, supra
note 7, at 809; they derived class size by dividing total law school enrollment by three which will give
a larger number where it includes graduate students who seldom participate in the clerkship market.
My class size numbers-from both Yale's internal files and Thomas Obhor's efforts, supra note
260-count only IDs. All clerk/class figures are likely to be incomplete over some range because
some students will accept clerkships at some distance after law school.
260 I am grateful to Marilyn Drees and Judith Calvert of Yale Law School's Career
Development and Registrar's Offices for providing these data. I am also grateful to Thomas Obhof
who laboriously tracked the law school attended by every appellate clerk for 1990-2001. He
uncovered many from Yale unknown to the Career Development Office.
261 Judge Posner has suggested a different reason for the relative success of Yale Law
students: that Yale students are much less interested in law practice than students at other major law
schools and, thus, find clerking more attractive as a post-graduate job. This hypothesis, of course, does
not address changes in relative Yale applicant success across years.
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to rely on information genemted at earlier periods in a student's career. The
very high rate of success of Yale students in the clerkship market seems to also
confirm the skepticism that it is useful to claim, at any point in the clerkship
selection process, that judges possess "inadequate". information upon which to
select clerks. The concept of information "inadequacy," again, is foreign to the
economic approach, except where no clerkship offers are extended. If no judge
has extended an offer, the information base is inadequate; conversely, where
judges are confident enough to extend offers, the information base is adequate
enough. More precisely, the timing of the clerkship market may shift to earlier
times where judges can obtain sufficient information about a candidate to justify
an offer through shifting the information base to pre-law school performance.
This analysis suggests the possibility that the advocacy of the Deans of
Yale Law School to constrain the clerkship market to later periods in students'
law school careers may not benefit Yale students on the whole. The effect is not
likely to be uniform across students. Some students may appear relatively more
attractive in the broader clerkship pool with another semester of law school
gmdes; other students may be relatively more attractive with fewer law school
gmdes and greater attention to college or other pre-law school performance. The
Yale Law School clerkship pool on the whole may well appear relatively more
attractive when less attention is given to law school performance and more
given to the credentials upon which they were admitted to Yale.
This analysis also suggests a future empirical test of the approach. As
mentioned, this past year the fedeml appellate judiciary agreed on a one-year
moratorium on the submission of clerkship applications from the 2004 law
school class, postponing the beginning point of the market until the first
semester ofa student's third year. Given that most believe that the momtorium
proved successful, Yale students should do relatively more poorly in
competition because the moratorium will have the effect of shifting the
information base away from the students' pre-law school record towards law
school, reducing the Yale advantage of earlier years. Data are not yet available
to test the hypothesis.
D. A Reanalysis of Unraveling in the Other Markets Identified by Professor
Roth
This Part employs the market search approach to reevaluate the many
other markets identified by Professor Roth as sulfuring unraveling.
The analysis of this paper differs from Professor Roth's in several respects.
First, by emphasizing the significance of the costs and benefits of information
acquisition as determinants of the timing of market transactions, the analysis is
highly skeptical of the concept of an "optimal" transaction time. Second, and
relatedly, by viewing market timing as an issue of information acquisition, the
analysis implies that efforts to regulate market timing are likely to be
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differentially harmful to participants in the market, in particular to those willing
to invest in search to benefit from an early commitment. 262 Third, the analysis
adopts a much narrower definition of market unraveling. There are many
contexts in which parties gain infonnation to inform potential future
transactions-such as audition electives for surgeons or summer intemships-
that are not usefully considered as market aberrations. They are expected
characteristics of markets in which the future value of the transaction is
uncertain and information is costly but obtainable through on-the-job
experience.
This is not to dismiss the concept of market unraveling, though perhaps
the pejorative connotation it gives to comparatively early market commitment
commends a different term. Professor Roth's three sources of the practice-
instability in matching because of transaction congestion; risk aversion of the
parties; and differential participant market position-are descriptively accurate
in many contexts. For example, in the market for judicial clerks, judges and
clerks are led to enter early agreements because both are averse to the risk of
obtaining a less fuvorable clerk or clerkship at a later date, something of an
amalgam of Professor Roth's risk aversion and differential market position
I . 263exp anatlOns.
Nevertheless, however descriptively accurate, the Roth explanations
constitute something less than a theory of unraveling. There exist many
markets in which participants can be expected to be averse to the risk of
diffurential market position at later dates that seem not to be characterized by
any form of unraveling. As mentioned, Professor Roth concedes that many
entry-level labor markets do not suffer unmanageable unraveling---entry level
MBAs and business school marketing professors.264 Many other labor markets
could be identified that are also relatively free of unraveling: the markets for
high school and college graduates, among others. It is implausible that there is
no aversion to the risk of future placement in any of these markets.
To my mind, there are two separate phenomena to which Professor
Roth's work has alerted us that explain virtually all of his examples of true
unraveling. One is a market phenomenon; the second, a regulatory
262 The emphasis on the significance of market information also implies that it reduces
aggregate welfare, a fortiori, to enforce market regulation by reducing the information available to
market participants---such as the Harvard-Chicago Study's recommendations of "[m]aking it more
difficult for judges to gather information _.." and "limiting the information available to judges,"
Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at 867 (recommending a "palliative" to help enforce set start
dates)-or otherwise impairing market matching-such as the Study'S recommendation of
randomizing matches to deter pre-match agreements in their modified medical match proposal, id. at
883-84.
263 I am not certain that there is any useful sense in which Professor Roth's risk aversion
and differential market position explanations can be considered separately. Differential market
position as between time T and time T - I will generate risk aversion.
264 Roth & Xing, supra note II, at 1013-14.
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phenomenon. They are related because they both involve constraints in some
form on the opemtion of market forces. .
The frrst and, I believe the most interesting, phenomena in the Roth
examples are markets in which time-of-offur is employed as a currency in the
market tmnsactions themselves. Professor Roth does not focus on time-of-ofler
as a currency, except to consistently recommend a matching mechanism in
order to suppress it. This paper, instead, proposes an explanation. As
explained above, time-of-offer emerges as a prominent currency where there are
restrictions in the market on the use of alternative terms of trade that might
otherwise serve the market clearing function. In markets in which the terms of
trade are truncated, a chief way for the parties to express their mutual intensities
of preference in the context of future tmnsaction uncertainty is through time-of-
offer.
The second phenomenon that explains other of Professor Roth's market
examples derives from market regulation. Many of the Roth examples show,
not unfettered market processes, but participant responses to market regulation.
The examples that correspond to Professor Roth's first unmveling
explanation-matching instability at the optimal market tmnsaction time
because of transaction congestion--derive, not from some characteristic inherent
to the underlying markets, but from forms of market regulation that constrain
tmnsactions to some "optimal" time. What Professor Roth calls "unmveling"
are efforts to evade those regulations.
Though different, the two phenomena are related in that they both appear
in contexts in which price or other terms of trade have been subjected to some
constraint. Transacting at a time different from what might be expected
according to an idealized notion of the optimal market time is a means of
overcoming that price restraint. Thus, again, far from representing a market
imperfection or a market failure, these actions represent market processes in
force to overcome artificial market constraints.
Below is a list of the markets identified by Professor Roth as possessing
timing problems with a short description of the respective problem. These
markets are listed in increasing order according to Professor Roth's four market
stages. Note that, as has been mentioned, Professor Roth's four stages do not
correspond to market phenomena. They are stages of differential levels of
regulation: stage I-an unregulated market; stage 2-attempts to establish
uniform dates; stage 3-adoption of a centralized clearing procedure, such as
the medical match; and stage 4-adoption of a centralized matching procedure,
but with cheating requiring further regulation. 265 Because of the focus on the
nature of the regulation, the unmveling phenomena are not always clearly
described.
265 [d. at 996-98.
184
HeinOnline -- 22 Yal J. on Reg. 185 2005
Reexamining the Market for Judicial Clerks
Markets with Unraveling or Controls on Transaction Timing
1) Federal court clerkships-substantial unraveling through early
a:..... 1 1 . 266Oil";U,; many proposa s to regu ate; current one-year moratonum;
2) First year associates in American law firms-unraveling by the
ill f .. . 267o er 0 summer associate positIOns;
3) Graduating MBAs and marketing professors-occasional early
ill b . I' 268o ers, ut no senous unrave mg;
4) Humanities and social science graduates in Japan--<:oncems over
early offers and agreements between employers' organizations
d ' 1 . d 269regar mg emp oyment peno s;
5) Clinical psychology interns-proposals for unifonn employment
dates but no detailed evidence ofunraveling;270
6) Medical residents in the U.S. and other first-year medical
positions-substantial unraveling followed by adoption of the
medical match, although cheating on the match occurs through
d· . ·1 . 271au Ihon e ectIves;
7) Fraternities and sororities in U.S. colleges-unraveling in member
recruitment: the "rush;"m
8) Articling law students in Ontario-alleged unraveling, followed by
adoption of a matching mechanism, but with cheating on the
h · h gh d . h' 273mec anlsm t rou stu ent summer mterns IpS;
9) College and professional athletes-no unraveling, but adoption of
fi d . ., d l' d draft 274xe recruiting times an centra Ize s;
10) Academic markets for mathematicians, biologists and chemists-
unraveling through initial appointments in {JOst-doctoral degree
positions prior to securing faculty positions?7
11) Postseason college football bowls-unraveling through early olfers
to teams followed by centralized bowl assignments;276
12) Medieval commodity markets-unraveling in the fonn of pre-
k . d . 277mar et peno transactions;
266 Roth & Xing, supra note 11, at 1000-05.
267 [d. at 1004-07.
268 [d. at 1013-14.
269 [d. at 1015-16.
270 . [d. at 1016-18.
271 [d. at 998-1000,1018-19,1020-24.
272 [d. at 1019-20.
273 [d. at 1024-25.
274 [d. at 1025-26.
275 [d. at 1026-27.
276 [d. at 1007-13.
277 [d. at 1027-28 & n.68.
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13) Chicago Board of Trade-prohibition on member sales of in
transit grain at other than at a fixed price, similar to other
. ., h k 278restrIctIOns servmg to create t e mar et.
Note that, in various of these markets, the purported problem consists of
an institutional structure or practice that allows the potential employer to gain
additional information about the worker (and, possibly, the worker to gain
information about the employer) prior to entering the final employment
transaction. Thus, in 2) above, first year law associates are hired typically after
serving the fum for some months during a preceding summer, a position
similar to 6), audition electives for surgeons. Somewhat diffurently, in 10)
above (and in many other scientific areas), recent PhDs gain experience in
research positions following completion of their doctoral degree, but prior to
obtaining an academic faculty job. Professor Roth characterizes these activities
as "unraveling" because they represent interactions that might lead to a market
transaction-the employment hire-prior to some defined time. But as
discussed, I do not view this definition of unraveling as helpful. Shopping
prior to purchase is not unraveling and is to be expected in some form in every
market.
In those markets in which there appears evidence of unraveling,279 I
believe that most of the practices can be understood as deriving from
restrictions on the availability of price as a currency to clear the market, though
in two separate contexts: the first, where time-of-offur becomes a currency; the
second, where the timing of market transactions becomes a means of evading
some form of market regulation.
Time-of-offi:r currency markets
1) Federal clerkships
6) Medical residents
7) Fraternity-sorority rush
8) Articling in Ontario
9) College and professional athletes
11) College football bowl games
Transaction timing to evade
. regulation
12) Medieval commodity markets
13) Chicago Board of Trade
278 Id. at 1028.
279 In various other of Professor Roth's examples, it is not evident that there is any
unraveling of import, though many involve discussions of regulation of market timing for reasons that
are not apparent from the description: 3) MBAs; 4) Japanese university graduates; 5) clinical
psychologists. Perhaps more study of these markets would clarify.
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I. Time-of-Offer Currency Markets Reviewed
This Section discusses those of Professor Roth's markets in which the
unraveling relates to the use of time as a currency to clear the market. The
hypothesis of the paper is that time becomes a currency where there are
restrictions on other terms of trade.
a. Federal clerkships
A lengthy discussion of federal clerkships is unnecessary here. As
explained in detail above,2so because clerkship salaries and benefits are set by
Congress, there are limited e1fective terms with which judges and clerks can
express intensity of preference in order to clear the market. Time-of-ofrer serves
that function for judges and clerks averse to the risk of constrained choices at
later market times.
b M d· I 'd 2S1. e lca reSI ents
In the U.S., following four years of medical school, students apply for a
residency position with a hospital, often with an announced medical specialty.
As has been mentioned, much of Professor Roth's work has been devoted to
organizing centralized matching mechanisms for residency positions of this
nature. 2B2 The first adoption of a centralized matching mechanism for general
residents followed several years in which the medical resident market was
characterized by serious unraveling-where time-of-ofrer served as a currency.
As Professor Roth describes the pre-match market,
Appointment dates unraveled from about the turn of the century until
1945, so that by 1944 medical students were arranging their postgraduate
employment as interns two years in advance of graduation. Starting in 1945 a
regime of uniform dates and times were introduced, and it was enforced with
the help of an apparently successful refusal of medical schools to provide
information [to hospitals] prior to a specified date. This succeeded in reversing
the unraveling, and appointment dates were fIrst moved back into the junior
year, and then into the senior year of medical school. However, in 1945 the
280 See supra Section II. A.
28 I I have been aided in this analysis by discussions as a consultant with a group of
attorneys that has filed an antitrust suit against various U.S. medical associations and the NRMP. I
express no view here on the merits of the litigation.
282 In addition to Roth & Xing, supra note II, see Roth, Medical Interns, supra note I I;
Alvin E. Roth, New Physicians: A Natural Experiment in Market Organization, 250 SCIENCE 1524
(1990); Alvin E. Roth & Elliott Peranson, The Redesign of the Matching Market for American
Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects ofEconomic Design, 89 AM. ECON. REv. 748 (1999); Alvin E.
Roth & Xiaolin Xing, Turnaround Time and BOlllenecks in Market Clearing: DecenTralized Marching
in the MarketforClinical Psychologists, 1051. PoL. ECON. 284 (1997).
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period specified for offers to remain open was ten days, and this interval shrunk
rapidly, so that by 1949 a 12-hour period was rejected as too long, and no
minimum duration at all was specified. The congestion in the market, with its
collateral missed opportunities and hasty agreements which were later
sometimes not honored, led to the adoption, in 1952, of a (voluntary)
centralized market-clearing procedure of the matchmaker variety.283
Table 7: Range of Salaries, lst Year Graduates: Medical, Law, 2001
Region
Northeast
South
Midwest
West
State
New York
Georgia
Ohio
California
Medical School Graduates
25ffi % 75ffi %
$35,930 $39,401
$33,445 $35,300
$35,353 $36,908
$32,700 $35,220
Law School Graduates
25th % 75th %
$47,500 $125,000
$45,000 $100,000
$40,000 $81,500
$54,000 $125,000
Range
$3,471
$1,855
$1,555
$2,520
Range
$77,500
$55,000
$41,500
$71,000
Sources: Derived by author from 2000 AAMC SURVEY OF HOUSESTAFF STIPENDS, BENEFITS
AND FuNDING, tbls.6, 8, at http://www.aamc.orglhlthcare/coth-hss/2000hsslhssOO_6.htm.
http://www.aamc.orglhlthcare/coth-hss/2000hss/hssOO_8.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2001);284 NALP,
STARTING SALARIES: WHAT NEW LAW GRADUATES EARN, CLASS OF 2001, at 10.
Thus, since 1952, medical residencies have been allocated by means ofa
matching program according to which both residents and hospitals, following
interviews, submit rank ordered preferences to a centralized organization which,
on a set date, matches them according to the respective highest rankings. This
matching program is designed to eliminate the early-offur competition
characteristic of markets such as judicial clerkships and is often justified as
necessary given the large number of medical graduates and the equally large
number of hospitals to which they are applying.
It is the hypothesis of this paper, in contrast, that the existence of early-
offer competition in markets such as medical residencies derives from the
283 Roth & Xing, supra note II, at 999.
284 The 2000 survey is no longer available on AAMC's new survey website,
http://www.aamc.orgldata/housestaff/start.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004); however, the current
website provides contact persons for inquiries regarding the surveys.
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limitations on price or other market mechanisms to clear the market. 285 To
examine the hypothesis, Table 7 above compares the salary range for fIrst-year
graduates in medicine and in law. It shows, for the year 200 I, the 25th and
75th percentile starting salaries for medical school graduates by region and for
law school graduates by state within the respective regions. 2R6 Each year, more
students graduate from law than from medical schools. In 2000, 38,152
students graduated from U.S. law schools, nearly two and one-half times the
15,286 who graduated from U.S. medical schools. 287 Neither Professor Roth
nor any other commentator (to my knowledge) has suggested that the market
for law school graduates is characterized by the usc of time-of-offur as a
currency.
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Figure 1: Range of Salaries, First-Year Medical Residents, 1952-2002
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I......A_ 88lary ..... 2501 peroor1IIIe __ 75Ih po!OOnlIIo I
For 1952-1978, data derived from J. AM. MED. ASS'N, various years, For 1979-2002, data
derived from COUNCIL OF TEACHING Hosps. & HEALTH SYS., ASS 'N OF AM. MED. COLLS., SURVEY OF
HOUSESTAFF STIPENDS, BENEFITS AND FUNDING, various years (data on file with author).
It is apparent from Table 7 that the range of available salaries both within
geographic regions and across regions is dramatically greater for law graduates
than for medical graduates (indeed, for all four geographic comparisons, more
than twenty times greater). Table 7, of course, only presents salary data for one
285 Ulrich Kamecke has hypothesized that the need for a centralized matching mechanism
for medical residents derives from insufficiently flexible wages. Kamecke, supra note 16.
286 The two data sources for medical school and law school graduate salaries do not match
and cannot be made to match given the published data-the medical data are given by region; the law
data, by state. 1 selected as representative large states within each region.
287 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: 2002, supra note 186, at 178 tb1.281.
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year. Although I have not been able to obtain comparable time-series data for
first-year law graduates, Figure 1 shows the range offirst-year medical resident
salaries since 1952. As is evident, resident salaries have been restricted within
an extraordinarily narrow range now for five decades.
Accelerated offers are not unknown in the market for law school graduates
which law school placement offices attempt to regulate. First-year associate
salaries are not entirely flexible, but appear to be constrained within levels by
type of firm, expected workload and city. These constraints may explain the
use of time-of-ofter for some applicants.
The narrow range of salaries available for medical residents explains why
time-of-after becomes a dominant currency in the market for medical school
graduates, but a lesser currency in the market for law school graduates. The
diffurence has nothing to do with the number of medical graduates and hospitals
that need to match; the numbers of law graduates and law firms are
substantially greater; the numbers of business school graduates and corporate
firms, greater yet. Time-of-ofter emerges as a currency or is suppressed by the
adoption of a centralized matching program because price is not available as a
mechanism to clear the market.
c. Fraternity-Sorority Rush
According to Professor Roth, in the 1800s, college fraternities and
sororities only admitted seniors to membership. Competition among them,
however, led to unraveling ofrecruitment dates, which led to the coining of the
word "rush" to describe the process. Professor Roth explains further that,
today, fraternity and sorority recruitment begins as soon as students arrive on
campus. Since students today can become members in their first college year,
unraveling problems have disappeared.288
Despite the apparent absence of current timing issues, it is obvious that
the terms of trade in the market for fraternity or sorority membership are quite
constrained. Like a judicial clerkship, an invitation to join a fraternity is a take-
it-or-leave-it ofter. Price and quality are not negotiable. Time-of-ofter, were it
relevant to today's market, could serve as an available term of trade.
d. Articling Law Students in Ontario
It is a requirement to join the practicing bar in Canada for a student to
serve between eight and twelve months as an articling clerk for a law firm, prior
288 The summary here comes from Roth & Xing, supra note II, at 1019-20. See also Susan
Mongell & Alvin E. Roth, Sorority Rush as a Two-Sided Matching Mechanism, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 441
(1991).
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to becoming a regular associate of the firm. 289 According to Professor Roth,
appointment dates for articling clerks began to unravel in the 1970s.290 In 1986,
a matching program was introduced in Toronto. 291 In subsequent years,
however, the market has adjusted so that students work for the law fIrms with
which they will clerk in the summer following their second year of law
school. 292 Professor Roth describes these summer clerkships as a form of
unraveling from the centralized match. 293
Table 8: Salaries of Articling Clerks, Ontario,* 1991-2002**
Year
1991
1992
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Low
$365
$450
$15,000
$24,000
$15,000
$27,800
$10,000
$24,000
$18,000
$20,000
High
$775
$800
$40,300
$45,500
$42,900
$44,200
$52,000
$52,000
$57,200
$78,000
Range
$410
$350
$25,300
$21,500
$27,900
$16,400
$42,000
$28,000
$39,200
$58,000
*The geographic aggregation for salary reporting varied year by year. 1991-1992: Southern
Ontario; 1995-1997: Ontario; 1998-1999: Toronto; 2000-2002: Ontario.
**1991-1992 are weekly salaries; 1995-2002, ten-month salaries.
Source: Derived by author from National Compensation Survey, CAN. LAW., various years (on
file with author).
The articling market provides an interesting example of the absence of
unraveling. The Dean of Placement at the University of Toronto Law School,
Bonnie Goldberg, has informed me that, though the centralized match remains
in place, it has become obsolete.294 As Professor Roth reported, students
typically will article with fInns with which they have worked during earlier
summers. In addition, however, a review of the articling clerk market shows
289 Bonnie Goldberg, Qualifying in Canada: The Articling Requirement, NALP BULL., Nov.
2001, at 6; Roth & Xing, supra note II, at 1024.
290 Roth & Xing, supra note II, at 1024.
291 ld.
292 ld.
293 ld. Unraveling from a matching mechanism is what defines Professor Roth's stage 4
market. /d. at 997.
294 Telephone Interview with Bonnie Goldberg, Assistant Dean Career Services, University
of Toronto Law School (Nov. 22, 2002).
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that there appears to be substantial salary flexibility in the market. Table 8
above shows the range of salaries for articling clerks in Ontario for reported
years since 1991.
The substantial differences between low and high artieling clerk salaries
indicates that price is an available currency in the clerk market to express
differential intensity of preference by law firms and clerks. Time-of-offur is not
needed to clear the market. As a consequence, the market matching mechanism,
otherwise designed to control the use of the time-of-ofler currency, becomes
obsolete.
e. College and Professional Athletes
Professor Roth describes the recruitment market for college and,
separately, professional athletes, not as exactly sulfuring timing problems, but
as markets in which there are regulations on timing both of the time of
transaction and of the age at which certain players can be recruited. The NCAA,
which regulates college athletics, places strict limitations on the dates during
which college coaches can recruit high school athletes, and strictly enforces an
announcement date, before which no high school student can commit to a
college sports program295 though-not reported by Professor Roth-there is
substantial pre-announcement commitment activity. Professional sports leagues
placed limitations on the age below which no athlete was allowed to join
professional sports, though these age limitations have been largely relaxed in
recent times. Thus, teams in the National Basketball Association can draft high
school students;296 National Football League teams can draft college
undergraduates at least three years removed from high school.
These respective forms of regulation, of course, suppress the use of time-
of-offur as a mechanism for recruitment to clear the market. It is evident, in the
context of college recruitment, that there are limited terms of trade to otherwise
serve the market-clearing role. The NCAA severely constrains both financial
and in-kind benefits available to college athletes. Given these constraints, the
college recruitment market might resemble the market fur judicial clerks where
time-of-offur could otherwise benefit various of the parties.
The professional sports restrictions can be similarly explained. The
professional sports leagues suppress the terms of employment transactions more
systematically though the institution of the draft, which eliminates all
negotiation over entry-level positions; salary-caps and the like enforce these
prohibitions. Interestingly, at later points in the team-athlete employment
relationship, for example when players become free agents able to negotiate
295 Roth & Xing, supra note II, at 1025.
296 Major league baseball tearns had commonly drafted high school students, though often
only to retain rights to them during the student's college years. Jd. at 1025 n.63.
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with other teams, it is not necessary for the leagues to strictly regulate time-of-
offer since price beeomes an active currency in the market.
£ 297College Football Bowl Games
I discuss Professor Roth's college football bowl game example last
because it is such a peculiar market. Professor Roth describes unraveling and
subsequent market regulation in the allocation of teams to post-season bowls,
choosing as his principal example the 1990-1991 bowl season.298 Prior to that
season, because of concerns about unraveling, the NCAA-which regulates
college football-established a "Pick-em Date," November 24, a date just prior
to the final two games of the regular season before which no bowl could extend
an invitation. During the 1990 season, however, it was reported in the press
that, thirteen days prior to the Pick-em Date, the Orange Bowl had entered an
agreement with Notre Dame. At that time, Notre Dame was ranked fIrst in the
country and Colorado (then, the favorite of the Big Eight Conference, to which
the Orange Bowl was contractually committed), ranked second. This would
have given the Orange Bowl a game between the two best teams in the nation.
Following the agreement, however, Notre Dame lost a game and ended the
regular season ranked fifth. The team ranked second at the end of the season,
Georgia Tech, ended up playing the number nineteen team, Nebraska, in the
Citrus Bowl. According to Professor Roth, the unraveling led to inefficient
matching preventing the fIrst and second best teams from playing each other,
requiring a subsequent opinion poll to determine which team would be
regarded as the season's national champion. Similar problems during
succeeding seasons led to proposals to centralize bowl game control,
culminating in the adoption of the Bowl Championship Series (B.C.S.), now
. ffi 299III e ect.
The college bowl market is somewhat unusual. College football teams
compete in various conferences organized generally geographically among
schools of similar size. Bowl games are played at the end of the conference
season among the champion teams of each conference and, in lesser bowls,
among second- and third-place conference teams. The bowl games are organized
in major, chiefly southern, cities, one per city, and are played on various dates
from the end of the regular conference season in early December until, today,
just after New Year's Day. To maximize television revenue, dates and times
are chosen so as not to conflict with other bowl games (or with NFL games).
297 My understanding of this market has been greatly aided by discussions with Steven E.
Ehrhart, Executive Director of the Liberty Bowl, Memphis, Tennessee.
298 See Roth & Xing, supra note 11, at J009-12 & tb1.2 for their discussion of the 1990-J99J
season, which this Section summarizes.
299 The Roth and Xing paper was published prior to adoption of the RCS., though they
discuss some precursors.ld. at 1013.
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Although there are some variations, the largest and oldest bowls are played last
in the season and are regarded as the most prestigious. Although some bowls
are proprietary, most are organized as community non-profits pledging 75% of
net television and gate revenues to the two competing teams.
Competition among the bowls is quite constrained. Most of the bowls
have established contractual alliances with specific conferences; some, like the
Orange Bowl in 1990, retain discretion to choose at least one team at-large.
The extent of price flexibility in attracting an at-large team, however, appears
very limited. Gate revenues are basically fixed because of fixed stadium size.
Television revenues appear largely fixed according to the date and time
established for the bowl. As a consequence, time-of-offer can emerge as an
available currency.
Professor Roth's conclusion that the use of time-of-ofter as a currency
leads to inefficiency-the failure of the first- and second-ranked teams to play
each other-requires some interpretation and is not obviously supportable.
That failure is an artifact, first, of the seeming fan desire to designate one team
as the national '~champion,,30o and, second, of the decision of the NCAA not to
organize a championship football tournament. The logistics of such a
tournament would be difficult-for example, it requires six sets of games to
determine an NCAA basketball champion, and a football team seldom plays
games less than a week apart. Certainly, there is substantial fan interest in
identifying a single football champion, though even where a championship
game can be contrived, it pits teams according to rankings, not victories
through a tournament. Moreover, it is not obvious where efficiency is measured
in terms of audience interest or aggregate television revenues that a game
pitting the first- and second-ranked teams will outdraw separate games
requiring a subsequent qualitative evaluation to name a single "best" team.
The current B.C.S. has becn organized by an agreement of six
conferences, as well as by ABC and ESPN, television companies possessing
contractual rights to broadcast twenty-five of today's twenty-eight bowl games.
The agreement provides for the first- and second-ranked teams to play for a
championship, but at the expense of any competition among the bowls and to
the exclusion of almost all teams from conferences other than those six. Time-
of-offer is suppressed here by a regulatory-like agreement among the largest
conferences and the networks possessing broadcast rights.30l
300 Of course, each conference has a champion, determined by the outcome of regular
season games or by a post-season tournament.
301 Discussion with Steven E. Ehrhart, supra note 297. Note that I ignore a brief discussion
in Roth & Xing of child marriage in various cultures as a form of unraveling. Roth and Xing. supra
note II, at 1026. Whether this cultural practice should be considered in all contexts as market
unraveling or is better understood in relation to other cultural features, such as tribe or family
alliances, wealth aggregation, and the like, is no doubt a difficult question. BUI see Nepal. The Bride
Wore Diapers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2003, at A6:
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2. Markets Where Timing Is a Means of Avoiding Regulation
This Section discusses other of Professor Roth's examples of unraveling,
here explaining them by a different sort of market restriction. In the following
examples, the timing of market transactions serves as a means of avoiding
forms of market-suppressing regulation.
a. Medieval Commodity Markets
Professor Roth identifies an ancient form of regulation of unraveling in the
medieval prohibition of the practice offorestalling, defined as buying or selling
certain commodities prior to their delivery at an organized market. Professor
Roth provides two examples of the prohibition:
Thus at Norwich no one might forestall provisions by buying, or paying
"earnest money" for them before the Cathedral bell had rung for the mass of
the Blessed Virgin; at Berwick-on-Tweed no one was to buy salmon
between sunset and sunrise, or wool and hides except at the market-cross
between 9 and 12; and at Salisbury persons bringing victuals into the city
302
were not to sell them before broad day.
This example obviously illustrates restrictions imposed in order to create an
organized market.
Professor Roth's second example is somewhat different.
In 1233 Eve de Braose complained that Richard Fitz-Stephen had raised a
market at Dartmouth to the injury ofhers at Totnes, as ships which ought to
come to Totnes were stopped at Dartmouth and paid customs there. No
decision was reached, and eight years later Eve's husband, William de
Cantelupe, brought a similar suit against Richard's son Gilbert. The latter
pleaded that his market was on Wednesday and that at Totnes on Saturday;
but the jury said that the market at Dartmouth was to the injury ofTotnes ...
and also that cattle and sheep which used to be taken to the Totnes market
were now sold at Dartmouth; the market at Dartmouth was therefore
disallowed.303
The Totnes-Dartmouth dispute appears to involve competition between
markets. The timing of transactions is an issue solely because the Dartmouth
market is open on Wednesdays, the Totnes market, on Saturdays. The
existence of the Dartmouth market, however, diverts sales from Totnes.
A 6-month-old girl and a 3-year-old boy were married in a southern village despite laws
against child marriages, the newspaper Taja Khabar reported. The parents, members of a
farming caste, arranged the marriage ... because they feared that the children would be
unable to find partners later in life, the newspaper said.
This example clearly represents Professor Roth's unraveling, not implausibly the consequence of the
concern about future limited terms of trade in the marriage market.
302 Roth & Xing, supra note I I, at 1027 (citing SALZMAN, supra note 169, at 76).
303 !d. at 1028 n.68 (citing SALZMAN, supra note 169, at 132-33).
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Is it useful to interpret these as examples of market unraveling? I think
not. These restrictions are more readily understood when the institutional
structure of medieval markets is clarified. Medieval markets were not simply
organized areas defined to facilitate market exchange. They were monopolies
granted (sold) by the king as revenue. The monopoly grant generated the
greatest revenue for the holder of the grant and, thus, the highest price to the
king. As Franklin Jones describes it,
Fairs and markets could only be held by grant of the Crown No markets
were permitted within six and two-thirds miles of each other The owners
of the markets or fairs usually exacted tolls on sales and a charge known as
stallage for space for stalls in which to display goods. If they had a
monopoly in specified territory their charges were often excessive. The
obstruction of those coming to market so as to deprive the market owner of
his stallage and the people of an unrestricted market in which to buy and
sell, was called forestalling and was unlawful, both at the common law and
304
under the statu tes.
Similarly, according to Schueller, "[e]very deal concluded outside an
authorized market place or outside official market hours was looked upon as tax
. ,,305
evasIOn.
The prohibition of forestalling, thus, was a means of Frotecting the
revenues generated from the operation of monopoly markets. 30 The practice
304 Franklin D. Jones, Historical Development ofthe Law ofBusiness Competition, 35 YALE
L.J. 905, 906-07 (1926). William Letwin makes a similar point. According to Letwin, forestalling-
sales outside the organized market-
was abhorred ... by those who saw in it an infringement of their privileges as owners of
markets. Rights to hold markets were granted or confirmed by the Crown, and established
local but powerful monopolies. What was given was not the mere right to hold a market, but
an exclusive right... The owners of markets often had an intense interest in protecting their
exclusive rights, for some of them had the right to charge a toll on certain goods sold in the
market, and all of them were entitled to charge fees for market stalls put up on their land. To
hinder sellers from coming to a market was therefore to deprive the owner of the market of
stallage fees.
WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 35 (1965).
305 George H. Schueller, The New Antitrnst Illegality Per Se: Forestalling and Patent
Misuse, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 170,176 & n.45 (1950) (citing "the case against Alice de Comcet (date
unknown), in 5 SELDEN SocIETY 57 (1891) (defendant bought 'one quarter of wheat outside town,
meeting it on the way to market ... whereby the Bailiffs lose toll')"). Professor Roth's source for his
examples makes a similar point: "In all these cases, the chief cause of complaint was the loss of
tolls ... the main source of profit of a market ...." SALZMAN, supra note 169, at 133.
306 The practice of forestalling extended to other activities as well, in particular buying
goods at some point outside a market with an ambition of selling them in the market, presumably at a
higher price. This form of forestalling resembles the crime of engrossing (buying large quantities of
commodities for resale) and was, purportedly a mechanism for medieval price control. See 4
WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 375-79 (2d ed. 1937); LETWIN, supra note
304; Wendell Herbruck, Forestalling, Regrating and Engrossing, 27 MICH. L REV. 365 (1929); Jones,
supra note 304; Schueller, supra note 305. Principally, these were prohibitions on the trade of
middlemen or speculators. Adam Smith devastatingly criticized these prohibitions on the grounds that
removing the middlemen impeded price discovery and the ability of prices to fluctuate appropriately
with supply and demand by preventing price information from reaching the market. 2 ADAM SMITH,
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itself was a form of unraveling, but here unraveling to avoid the tolls and taxes
imposed upon transactions in the market. As shall be discussed in more detail
next, transactions occurring outside markets may be viewed as a form of free-
riding on the existence of the market. An example would be a transaction
between parties who found each other just outside the market gate. In contrast,
other of these restrictions may simply shore up the market monopoly. For
example, it is not evident that the sale of salmon after dark-prohibited in
Berwick-on-Tweed in Professor Roth's first example-represents free riding.
Similarly, the dispute between the owners of the markets in Totnes and
Dartmouth does not involve free riding. One market is competing with another;
the one with the monopoly grant from the king prevailed, surely to the
detriment of market participants. In these examples, sales outside the market-
the purported unraveling-represent efforts to avoid the deleterious effects of the
monopoly tolls and thus, are market enhancing-again, not a sign of some
k · rfec' 307mar et Impe tIon.
b. Chicago Board of Trade
Professor Roth's final example is the market restriction exposed in the
fumous Chicago Board of Trade antitrust case308 The Justice Department
prosecuted the Board under the Sherman Act for adopting a rule that created a
special period-the "call"-just after regular hours, for the sale of grain in
transit to Chicago ("to arrive" grain), but constrained Board members, during
the period from the end of the call to the beginning of the next business day,
from entering transactions for the sale of that grain at any price other than the
closing price at the end of the call. 309 The case is significant in antitrust law as
representing the victory of those members of the Supreme Court who wanted
more flexibility in Sherman Act analysis over those wanting every form of price
restriction to constitute a violation. The case establishes the basic interpretive
contours of the Rule of Reason, weighing the benefits of some market
restriction against any anticompetitive effi:cts. The example is significant to
Professor Roth as an illustration showing that market limitations relating to
price, like other regulations of market operation-such as the definition of the
regular hours for Board trading---ean enhance the market.310 The analogue to
AN INQUIRY INTO TIlE NATURE AND CAUSES OF TIlE WEALTII OF NATIONS, bk. IV, ch. 5, at 104-11
(James E. Thorold Rogers ed., Oxford Clarendon Press 1869).
307 As a related example, Roth and Xing note the example in the post-Soviet Union
economy of consumers making deals directly with suppliers, rather than with the shops to be supplied.
This practice is likely to have derived from the imposition of price or supply restrictions on products;
Roth and Xing do not explain. Roth & Xing, supra note 11. at 1028.
308 Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
309 ld. at 236-37.
310 Roth & Xing, supra note II, at 1028.
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unraveling is the sale by Board members of "to arrive" grain after regular Board
hours on one day, but before Board hours on the next.
The current understanding of the practice and of the case mirrors the Roth
interpretation. Thus, the role restricts trade over sonie range: limiting sales to
the closing price means that, if there are supply or demand changes (or
predictions of them) that might change the effective grain price between the end
of the call period and the opening of the Board the next day, transactions
involving Board members will have to wait. The restriction is regarded as
market enhancing, however, because-presumably like the creation of the
Board of Trade as a market itself-it facilitates trade by forcing transactions
into the market. On this reasoning, in an excellent article explaining the
operation of the rule, Peter Carstensen concludes that it constituted a restraint
"ancillary" to the rules creating the market. 311
Both Carstensen and Richard Zerbe have shown that the rule was imposed
by the Board as an effort of Board members who were commission merchants
to gain a ~ter share of grain sales over Board members. who owned grain
elevators.3l Prior to adoption of the rule, the grain elevator members
dominated grain sales after Board hours because of advantages from vertical
integration from their elevator operations. By constraining the price at which
they as Board members could buy grain (to the call's closing price), more sales
were shifted to regular Board hours when non-elevator commission merchants
were better able to compete.
It is an interesting analytical question whether this form of restriction
should be regarded as market-enhancing. Surely, creating a market is market-
enhancing. For example, defining the hours during which the market will be
open-even if limited to less than twenty-four hours per day-is market-
enhancing in the sense that it creates a known time for the conduct of market
transactions. Like other forms of centralized markets, defining time and place
announces the conditions under which parties can come together to most
effuctively buy or sell.
Analytically, however, restrictions such as the "call" rule are different and
restrain trade rather than enhance it. The rule is superficially similar to the
announcement of limited times of market operation as it forces transactions into
the organized market. The diffurence is that it achieves this effect by prohibiting
transactions at other times that some parties would prefer to enter. The
establishment of the operating hours of the Board of Trade---or of any other
311 Peter C. Carstensen, The Content ofthe Hollow Core ofAntitrust: The Chicago Board of
Trade Case and the Meaning of the "Rule of Reason" in Restraint of Trade Analysis, 15 RES. L. &
ECON. 1 (1992). Richard Zerbe, in essence, concludes similarly, though he emphasizes that the "call"
rule was incidental to the adoption of fIxed commission rates by the Board which today would be a
clear antitrust violation. Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., The Chicago Board of Trade Case: 1918,5 REs. L. &
ECON. 17 (1983).
312 Zerbe, supra note 311; Carstensen, supra note 311.
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centralized market-allows anyone wanting to transact in that market to come
and take advantage of market benefits: the presence of greater numbers of buyers
and sellers enhancing competition and reducing price and price dispersion.
Parties that choose to transact after market hours, however, do so after
concluding that the benefits of trade are greater at the after-hour time than
waiting for the market to open. By constraining such transactions, restrictions
like the "call" rule reduce aggregate welfure. The transactions that the call rule
sought to prohibit do not represent free riding on the organized market because,
by definition, they were transactions at prices other than those established by
the market itself, thus deriving from separately acquired infonnation or
prediction.
As in other contexts, the unraveling here represents opportunities for
parties to gain in contrast to transactions subject to the constraints of the Board
of Trade. The "call" rule, then, resembles the prohibition of forestalling-
buying and selling outside the market. In this respect, it also resembles
constraints on the time at which judges can hire clerks. In each of these
contexts, though superficially the restrictions appear to enhance the market by
forcing transactions into it, each actually constrains market transactions that
parties would otherwise prefer to enter.
3. Summary
All of the markets identified by Professor Roth as possessing timing
disturbances (at least all for which there is sufficient information) can be seen to
be characterized by constraints on alternative tcnns of trade. Time-of-transaction
becomes relevant because other mechanisms to clear the market-most notably,
price-are restricted in some way. These timing phenomena reflect the working
out of market forces enhancing aggregate welfure and are not market failures
suggesting some fonn of welfure loss that can be cured by regulation. To the
contrary, welfure would be enhanced by eliminating the restrictions on the use
of price as a market-clearing device.
III. Judicial Disrepute and the Ethics of Practices in the Market for Clerks
Finally, this Part attempts to address carefully the accusation that the
operation of an unregulated market for clerks casts the federal judiciary into
disrepute. This accusation formed an element of the analysis of Judges Becker,
Breyer and Dean Calabresi,313 was central to the criticisms of the market by
313 Becker et aI., supra note 20, at 210 & n.S (quoting Judge Goodwin's analogy of the
market to a calf scramble); id. at 214 (citing Letter from Geoffrey R. Stone, Dean, University of
Chicago Law School, to Judge Becker I (July 7, 1993) (on file with author) ("The existing state of
affairs is nothing short of absurd. It demeans the federal judiciary ....")).
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Judges Wald314 and Oberdorfer,315 and was a principal nonnative conclusion of
the Harvard-Chicago Study.316 Even Judge Kozinski, an avid defender of an
unregulated market, conceded that the "system may be conducive to
undignified behavior or it may reward a lack of collegiality.,,317
In virtually all treatments of the clerkship market, this criticism is levied
generally against the process that compels competition among judges to secure
the most able clerks. Thus, Judge Wald criticizes the "intense competition
among judges" and the "covert maneuvering by judges and applicants;,,318
Judge Oberdorfer, that "judges extend offers in unseemly haste out of concern
that their colleagues on the bench will make offwith their prime prospects;,,319
Judges Becker, Breyer and Dean Calabresi, the "frenzy of offers and acceptances
[that] ensued within minutes of the [May 1, 1990] noon hour [set date];,,320 and
the Harvard-Chicago Study, the "frenzy of hiring" where "judges scheme to
outmaneuver one another in the effort to hire desirable clerks.,,321
In evaluating these criticisms of the clerkship market, however, it must be
seen that, though they seem to be complaints about the competitive process
itself, the content of the criticisms is not exactly that the process forces judges
to compete. Neither of the two principal proposed reforms-an established set
date, such as the current agreement to restrict applications until after Labor
Day, or a centralized computer matching system-eliminates competition
among judges. They, instead, channel that competition: the set date, to a later
time than that in which it would otherwise occur; the computerized match,
both to a later time and through a selection process that, as discussed, removes
time-of-offur as a currency, reinflating the competitive advantage of the
prominent judge. Moreover, there is no obvious normative basis for shielding
the judiciary from having to compete over staffing.
If, then, the generalized criticisms of the process are not immediately
supportable, perhaps it is some set of individual practices of judges or
applicants that taints the conduct of the clerkship market. After a careful reading
of the literature, including the detailed narrative complaints presented in the
314 "Maybe judges have to look harder into their own realities and perceptions to see if the
gamesmanship at which a few excel is really worth the angst and perceptions of unseemly competition
that now cloud the clerkship selection process." Wald, supra note 6, at 163.
315 "The current anarchic process by which federal judges select their law clerks is
inefficient, expensive, disruptive, and demeaning." Oberdorfer & Levy, supra note 6, at 1108; see
also id. at 1097 (noting that judges must "inspire and maintain firm public confidence in the decisions
that they make and the way that they make them. The present method used by federal judges to select
their law clerks unnecessarily jeopardizes that confidence. "); supra text accompanying note 50.
316 Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at 798-99.
317 Kozinski, supra note 6, at 1713.
318 Wald, supra note 6, at 152.
319 Oberdorfer & Levy, supra note 6, at 1098.
320 Becker et aI., supra note 20, at 211.
321 Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at 796.
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Harvard-Chicago Study, I have listed below all of those specific practices that
the various authors have criticized.
informing
competing
to keep offer open until applicant
favored judge, but reneging on the
7)
8)
3)
4)
2)
Practices regarded as Unethical in the Current Clerkship Market
A. Interview Scheduling Practices
I) Judge asking applicant to sneak into courthouse on
Sunday because the Judge'S court had agreed to comply
with a later set date;3 2
Judge insisting on interview at conflicting time with
interview scheduled with other judge;323
Judge canceling interview after applicant paid for trip to
. d ' . 324JU ge s City;
Judge interviewing applicant as back-up where all
available positions had been otrered to others;325
B. Substantive Interviewing Practices
5) Judge "badmouthing" other judges or
applicant of adverse infonnation about a
. d 326JU ge;
C. Offer Practices
6) Judge promising
interviewed with
. 327promIse;
Judge extending more offers to applicants than positions
possessed, with the frrst of those to accept receiving the
. . 328posltlons;
The extension of short-fuse or exploding offers;329
322 ld. at 835 tbU5.
323 Kozinski, supra note 6, at 1717.
324 Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at 835 tb1.15.
325 Id.
326 Margolick, supra note 22; Kozinski, supra note 6, at 1717. David Margolick also reports
judges as "spying and poaching" on other judges, though he is the only critic to list these offenses. It is
not clear what constitutes "spying;" perhaps, seeking to learn of candidates identified by another
judge, rather than discovering the candidate personally. This form of free riding can be condemned
though, again, Margolick's is the only reference to the practice. Margolick also neglects to define or
identif)r "poaching." In other contexts, the term implies interference with some property right. If a
judge induces breach of an agreement, it is contemptible. Again, there are no references in the
literature to this practice other than Margolick's .
327 Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7. at 819-20. Whether the judge actually reneged on
the promise or merely indicated displeasure that the applicant still wanted to interview the other jUdge
despite the first judge's offer is not clear from the description.
328 Id. at 819.
329 Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at 818; Becker et aI., supra note 20, at 222·23;
Kozinski, supra note 6, at 1716; Wald, supra note 6, at 156. But see supra Table 2, (shOWing relatively
low percentage of judges employing exploding offers).
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9) The use of other undefined "strong-ann" tactics. 330
To date, none of the critics of the clerkship market has carefully analyzed
the ethical content of these practices. Some are obviously questionable. For
example, 5) above, badmouthing other competitors, is objectionable in any
market, at least if the adverse information transmitted is untrue. If the
information is accurate, the judgment is more difficult. Similarly, it is not
difficult to condemn practice I), above, the request by a judge for the applicant
to sneak into chambers, because it represents, essentially, cheating on the
decision of the judge's court to comply with a later set date. This ethical
violation, however, derives not from the inherent operation of the market, but
from regulation of the market. The judge, clearly normatively conflicted with
the set date, proceeded around it. Nevertheless, there is no ethical defense for
the judge to avoid confronting the normative disagreement over the set date
honestly, and to bring the applicant in through the front door, rather asking the
applicant to "sneak" into the courthouse.
Similarly, many of the other seemingly high-handed practices by judges
are likely to be exacerbated, not solved, by reforms such as the set date. As
discussed above, established set dates' intensifY competitive pressures because
of the constrained period in which search is available. In contrast, some of these
practices-such as the examples of interview and offer manipulation, including
short-fuse offers-might well be abated by the establishment of a centralized
match because, again, the match suppresses the significance of time in the
market process.
In another light, however, it is important to identify in what contexts
these various competitive practices might be questioned. As described, the
market for clerks is one in which, because it is merely a one-year position and
because applicants' records are likely to be similar over a large range, any
judge is likely to [md many applicants whose qualifications are largely
indistinguishable. In a context of relative indifference among applicants, the
apparent high-handed behavior of judges can be understood. Insisting on a
conflicting interview, interviewing back-ups, offering more positions than are
available to the first of the applicants who accepts them, short-fuse offers, all are
comprehensible in a market in which there are limited real differences among
the applicants available to the judge.331
330 Kozinski, supra note 6, at 1729.
331 The Ad Hoc Connrutlee on Law Clerk Hiring considered the issue of exploding offers in
2003, but made no recommendation on it, allowing judges to determine the offer process. See HARRY
T. EDWARDS & EDWARD R. BECKER, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE LAW CLERK
HIRING PLA,,'l, http://www.cadc.uscourts.govlbin/lawc1erk/lawc1erkpdf/faqsjor_2004.pdf (last visited
Nov. 17,2004).
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Are such pmctices unethical? They may be unethical if they depart
substantially from the reasonable expectations of the applicant. Thus, if a judge
encourages an applicant to fly to the judge's city for an interview, but fills the
available position while the applicant is in flight, 3) above, the reasonable
expectations of the applicant have been breached. Yet, if the judge had informed
the applicant that the interview was currently available, but at the applicant's
risk of the position being filled prior to arrival, we would think entirely
differently of the event. Similarly, if an applicant knows that a judge extends
short-fuse or exploding offers and still seeks an interview with the judge, the
short term over which the offi:r is extended cannot be regarded as unfuir.
This suggests that, in the absence of other reforms, a helpful corrective to
pmctices of questionable defensibility described above is increasing the
information available to applicants about the practices of each fedeml judge. If
applicants know that a judge has had a history of interviewing back-ups, after
all positions are otherwise filled, 4) above,332 then the applicant will know to
inquire of the judge, prior to flying to the court, how many positions remain
open and what the prospects of advancing from back-up status actually are.
Similarly, if an applicant knows that a judge reneges on promises to keep offers
open, 6) above, the applicant can decline the interview with the judge or only
schedule it after interviewing with the favored judge. Many years ago, Judge
Kozinski recommended that law schools become repositories of market
information about the hiring practices of judges.333 It remains a sensible
reform. 334
All of the pmctices complained about above are pmctices of judges. But
judges cannot compel applications. Applications are in the hands of aspiring
clerks. Armed with sufficient information about individual judicial pmctices,
applicants need not expose themselves to interview scheduling or o1fur
exploitation by the fedeml judiciary. As in many other contexts, market
information allows consumers to police and select among the parties with
whom they might deal.
IV. Conclusion
The market for judicial clerks is an unusual market, but it is not an
incomprehensible one. Like many other assortative matching markets, both
judges and clerks face uncertainty over the success of a match. Given
restrictions on the availability of alternative terms of trade to reflect intensity of
332 It makes no sense for the judge to interview a back-up unless there is some chance that
the position might open, complicating the evaluation of the practice.
333 Kozinski, supra note 6, at 1724-28.
334 The Administrative Office has attempted to organize a centralized database of hiring
schedules-just one element of the information I am discussing-although the Harvard-Chicago Study
is generally dismissive of the effort. Harvard-Chicago Study, supra note 7, at 861-62.
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preference-here, inevitable restnctlOns on the availability of price, set by
Congress-time-of-oJfur emerges as a currency. The time currency rewards
judges who develop skills or techniques of recognizing talent based upon
limited information. Distributional consequences result from the exercise of
those skills, similar to the distributional consequences of the exercise of
predictive skills in other markets-like real estate or securities-in which
predictive ability allows early buyers to gain advantage over later ones. The
introduction of restrictions on the time-of-offur currency, like any other
restriction on terms of trade, will change the allocative outcomes of the market
for clerkships as well as other markets, but can generally be predicted to reduce
aggregate welfure.
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